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ATTORNEYS FEES, NOMINAL DAMAGES, AND
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
ThomasA.EatonandMichaelL.Wells*
Can plaintiffs recover atorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when they establish
constitutionalviolationsbutrecoveronlynominaldamagesorlow compensatory
damages?Somefederalappelatecourtshaveconcludedthatnofee,oraseverelyre-
ducedfee,shouldbeawardedinsuchcircumstances.Thisposition,whichwecalthe
low award, low fee approach,restsprimarilyontheSupremeCourts 1992 opinion
inFarrar v. Hobby.
We argue that a low award, low fee approach is misguided for two main reasons.
First,themajorityopinioninFarrar isfragmented,andthefactualrecordisopaque
regarding what and how the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated. These com-
plexitiesrenderFarrar apoorcaseuponwhichtoframearuleregardingtherelation-
ship between damage awards and the proper calculation of attorneys fees. Second,
the low award, low fee approach is inconsistent with congressional intent. When
Congressenacted§1988,itemphasizedthepublicbenefitofvindicatingconstitu-
tionalrightsanddeterringconstitutionalviolations.Nolessimportant,itrecognized
thattheharmscausedbyconstitutionalwrongsoftenarenoteasilymeasuredinterms
of traditional monetary remedies a circumstance that would discourage attorneys
from taking on the representation of plaintiffs in this important set of cases. The low
award, low fee approach contravenes these purposes because it effectively discour-
agesthebringingofalargequantityofhighlymeritoriouscasesinvolvingtheabridge-
mentofconstitutionalrights.Indeed,theeffectofthisapproachisperversebecause
it blocks the recovery of meaningful atorneys fees in the very set of low damages
seriousconstitutional-wrongcasesinwhichtheneedtoincentivizetheprovisionof
legalservicesismostpressing.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the American Rule, each party pays his own attorneys fees.1TheCivil
Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, which is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
carves out an exception to this rule. The statute provides that [i]n any action or pro-
ceedingtoenforceaprovisionof[certainspecifiedcivilrightsstatutes],thecourt,in
its discretion, may alow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable atorneys fee as part of
the costs . . . .2Themostimportantofthestatutesspecifiedin§1988is42U.S.C.
§1983,whichauthorizessuitagainst every person who violates constitutional rights
under color of state law.3
1 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (repu-
diatinglowercourtdecisionsthathad ignored the American Rule).
2 42U.S.C.§1988(b)(2012).
3 Id. §1983.Thus:
Everypersonwho,undercolorofanystatute,ordinance,regulation,
custom,orusage,ofanyStateorTerritoryortheDistrictofColumbia,
subjects,orcausestobesubjected,any...personwithinthejurisdic-
tion[oftheUnitedStates]tothedeprivationofanyrights,privileges,
orimmunitiessecuredbytheConstitutionandlaws,shallbeliableto
thepartyinjuredinanactionatlaw,suitinequity,orotherproperpro-
ceedingforredress....
Id.
Section1983isaReconstruction-eracivilrightsstatute.MichaelB.Brennan,Note,
Okurev.Owens: Choosing Among Personal Injury Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983,
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ApplicationoftheAttorneys Fees Awards Act to constitutional litigation under
§1983raisesarecurringissueonwhichlowercourtsaredivided:Ifaprevailing
plaintiffrecoversonlynominaldamages,ornothingmorethanasmallcompensatory
sum, should this circumstance bear on the calculation of a reasonable fee? The
Supreme Court has declared that the most critical factor in determining the reason-
ableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.4 Buthow doesone
measure success? Is it better to treat all low award cases alike, denying or severely
restrictingthefeeawardforallofthem?Orshouldcourtsdistinguishbetweenfee
applicationsdependingonthereasonforthelow award?Inonesetofcases,the
answerisclear.InFarrar v. Hobby,5theplaintiffprovedthathisconstitutionalright
hadbeenviolatedbutfailedtopersuadethejurythattheharm forwhichhesought
redresswascaused by theviolation.6 TheCourtheld thatfeesshould notbe
awarded.7Inasecondsetofcases,theexplanationforthelow damagesawardlies
in the interaction between the black letter rules on proof of tort damages which
applytoconstitutionaltortcasesaswell8 and the difficulty of assigning a monetary
valuetoconstitutionalrights.Undertheserules,plaintiffsmayhavegreatdifficulty
showingsubstantialdamagesfrom constitutionalviolationseventhoughthefactors
thattrippedupFarrararenotpresent.TheissuethatdividestheCircuitCourtsofAp-
pealsiswhetherthelevelofdamagesshouldcountagainsttheplaintiffinsuchacase.
TwoSupremeCourtcasesbearonthisissue,thoughtheypointindifferentdi-
rections.InFarrar v. Hobby,theSupremeCourtdeniedafeetoFarrar,whosought
$17million,basedonaclaim thatagroupofdefendantshadconspiredtodestroy
theeconomicvalueofaschoolheowned.9Hobby,theTexasLieutenantGovernor,
82NW.U.L.REV.1306,1327(1988).Theotherstatutesfrom thateraspecifiedin§1988
are:§1981(authorizingacauseofactionforracialdiscriminationinmakingandenforcing
contracts); § 1982 (guaranteeing, against racial discrimination, the right to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property); § 1985 (forbidding conspiracies
tointerferewithcivilrights);and§1986(authorizingsuitsagainstpersonswhoknowabout
conspiracies, have the power to stop them, and neglect[] or refuse[] so to do).
Section 1988 also authorizes attorneys fees inlitigationundercertainmoderncivilrights
statutes,includingTitleIX,whichaddressessexdiscriminationineducation,theReligious
Freedom RestorationActof1993,theReligiousLandUseandInstitutionalizedPersonsAct
of2000,TitleVI oftheCivilRightsActof1964,whichprohibitsdiscriminationinfederally
assistedprograms,and42U.S.C.§13981,whichprohibitsgender-motivatedcrimesofvio-
lence.See §1988.
In this Article, we are concerned solely with attorneys fees in § 1983 litigation.
4 Hensleyv.Eckerhart,461U.S.424,436(1983).
5 506U.S.103(1992).
6 Id. at106.
7 Id. at105.
8 See MemphisCmty.Sch.Dist.v.Stachura,477U.S.299,306(1986);see also Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978) (rejecting the concept of presumed damages in the con-
textofaviolationofproceduraldueprocess).
9 506U.S.at106.
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wasoneofthedefendants.10Farrarprevailedonthemeritsofoneclaim againstHobby
butreceivedonlynominaldamagesofonedollar.11 Farrars claim for a large award
againstHobbyfailedfortworeasons.First,thejuryfoundthatHobbywasnotpart
ofanyconspiracy.12 Second, although the jury found that Hobby deprived . . .
Farrar of a civil right, his conduct was not a proximate cause of any damages.13
Faced with this record, the Court concluded that Farrar failed to prove an essential
element of his claim for monetary relief.14 The Court said that [w]hen a plaintiff
recoversonlynominaldamagesbecauseofhisfailuretoproveanessentialelement
of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.15
SeveralcircuitcourtsrecognizenodistinctionbetweenFarrar and the intangi-
ble harm cases. They read Farrar broadlytostandforthegeneralprinciplethat
monetaryreliefisthemeasureofsuccess,sothatanawardofnominalorlow compen-
satorydamagesgivesrisetoastrongpresumptioninfavorofeithernooradrasticaly
reduced award of attorneys fees.16 We will call this approach low award, low fee.
ButFarrar, on its facts, is a weak case for establishing a general rule for attorneys
fees on account of the scope of the litigation, the plaintiffs failure to prove any lia-
bility against al but one defendant, the jurys opaque finding of a violation of a civil
right on Hobbys part, and the absence of a causal link between the large damages
claimedandtheconstitutionalviolationfoundbythejury.17
Farrar hasbeenreadmorenarrowlybyothercircuitcourtsbasedonanother
SupremeCourtcase.BeforeFarrar,thepluralityopinioninCity of Riverside v.
Rivera18 had rejected the propositionthatfeeawardsunder§1988shouldneces-
sarilybeproportionatetotheamountofdamagesacivilrightsplaintiffactually
recovers.19Relyingonthisproposition,severalcircuitcourtshaveheldthatasub-
stantialfeemaybeawardedevenwhentheplaintiffobtainsonlynominaldamages.20
10 Id.
11 Id. at116.
12 Id. at 106. Moreover, the conspiracy was not a proximate cause of any injury suffered
by the plaintiffs. Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at115.
15 Id. (citationomitted).
16 See Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 55657 (7th Cir. 2014); Richardson v. City of
Chicago,740F.3d1099(7thCir.2014);McAfeev.Boczar,738F.3d81(4thCir.2013);
Apontev.CityofChicago,728F.3d724(7thCir.2013);Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,
720F.3d887(11thCir.2013).
17 506U.S.at106.
18 477U.S.561(1986)(pluralityopinion).
19 Id. at574.See Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 11415 (1st Cir. 2008). Taking this
propositionasitspremise,theFirstCircuitpanelapprovedafeeawardof$172,248.21,though
thedamagesawardedwerejust$17,980.Id.
20 See, e.g.,Hescottv.CityofSaginaw,757F.3d518,527(6thCir.2014);Matusickv.
ErieCty.WaterAuth.,757F.3d31,64(2dCir.2014).InMatusick,thedistrictcourtreduced
therequestedfeeandtheappellatecourtaffirmed,butthereasonforthereductionwasalack
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Oneithersideofthesplit,mostoftheopinionsdonotseem torecognizetheexistence
oftheotherview.
Thisdifferenceinapproachisofgreatimportancebecauseitbearsonthereal-
worldavailabilityofakeyremedyformanyprospectiveconstitutionaltortplain-
tiffs.Italsoraisesmajorquestionsaboutconstitutionaltorttheory,particularlyas
towhethercourtsshouldencouragethevindicationofconstitutionalrightswhenthe
monetaryrecoverywilprobablybesmal.ThisArticlearguesthat:(1)itiswrongto
extrapolateageneralprinciplefrom Farrar thatplaintiffswhorecoveronlynominal
damages are presumptively foreclosed from securing attorneys fees under § 1988;
and (2) in any event, such fees should remain recoverable often in substantial
amounts whenever a plaintiff recovers some measure of compensatory damages,
evenifsmallinamount.Atfirstblush,thesemattersmayseem toinvolvenothing
morethantheeconomicwell-beingofattorneys,butfarmorethanthatisatstake.
Congressenacted§1988inordertofacilitatethevindicationofconstitutionalrights
and deterconstitutionalviolations.Thecoreideabehind thestatuteisthatthe
meaningfulenforcementofconstitutionalrightsrequiresasharpdeparturefrom the
American Rule on attorneys fees. The low award, low fee rule implicitly as-
sumes that constitutional enforcement deserves greater encouragement through
larger fee awards in high compensatory damages cases than in low damages cases.
ofdocumentationbytheatorney.757F.3dat65.Inearlierdecisions,appellatecourtsapproved
substantialfeeawardsincasesalthoughtheplaintiffrecoveredeithernominalcompensatory
damagesorawardslowerthantheysought.See, e.g.,Zinnav.Congrove,680F.3d1236,
1237 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the broad low award, low fee principle in a case in which
aplaintiffreceived$1,791incompensatorydamages);Mahach-Watkinsv.Depee,593F.3d
1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (awarding more than $136,000 in attorneys fees and costs to a
plaintiffwhoreceivednominaldamagesfollowingafatalshooting);EstateofEnochex rel.
Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2009) (In cases which involve more than a
nominalaward,wehaverejectedthenotionthatthefeeawardshouldbereducedbecausethe
damagesweresmallerthanaplaintifforiginallysoughtorthatthefeeawardmight,infact,
be more than the plaintiffs recovery.); McCown v. City of Fontana, 565F.3d1097,1105
(9thCir.2009)(notingthataplaintiffmayobtainanexcellentresult,evenifthedamagesare
low);Lowryv.WatsonChapelSch.Dist.,540F.3d752,764(8thCir.2008) (In Farrar,
privatedamageswerethepurposeofthelitigation,andofthe$17millionrequestedinthat
case . . . . Here, in contrast, the purpose of the litigation was not private damages.); Diaz-
Riverav.Rivera-Rodriguez,377F.3d119,125(1stCir.2004)(holding,despiteFarrar,that
the plaintiffs victory on a procedural due process claim warranted a substantial fee based
on the determination that the municipality violated plaintiffs constitutional rights repre-
sented a significant legal conclusion serving an important public purpose); Murray v. City
of Onawa, 323 F.3d 616, 617 (8th Cir. 2003) (awarding attorneys fees to a plaintiff who re-
coverednominaldamagesfrom acitythatfailedtoprotectherfrom sexualharassment);
OConnor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1997) (awarding attorneys fees to a pretrial
detaineewhorecoverednominaldamagesfrom thedefendantwhodeniedhermedicalcare).
Cf. Barberv.T.D.Williamson,Inc.,254F.3d1223,1225(10thCir.2001)(remandingtothe
district court to consider awarding attorneys fees to a Title VII plaintiff who proved he was
avictim ofahostileworkenvironmentbutwasawardedonlynominaldamages).
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Yet, the need to assure attorneys fees for the establishment of constitutional wrongs
will be especially great when provable damages are low. Thus, the effect of the low
award, low fee rule is tosubverttheessentialpurposeof§1988bydiscouraging
§1983litigationintheverysetofcasesinwhichthegreatestneedexiststoencour-
agesuitstovindicateconstitutionalguaranteesanddetertheirviolation.
At the same time, a sweeping rule favoring a full attorneys fee for any plaintiff
who qualifies as a prevailing party would be unrealistic and unwise. The statute,
by its terms, accords the district court discretion to depart from the American Rule
and authorizes only a reasonable fee.21 Moreover,prospectofrecoveryofattor-
neys fees carries with it social costs, especially by encouraging wasteful and even
destructivelitigation.InHensley v. Eckerhart,22theSupremeCourtrecognizedthat
afeeshouldnotbeawardedfortimespentonseparateunsuccessfulclaims,evenif
theplaintiffprevailsonsomeissues.23Buildingonthisidea,Farrar rightlyrecog-
nizes that there are good reasons to deny fees to plaintiffs who obtain only techni-
cal victories. Even so, it is wrong to read Farrar as supporting a rigid low award,
low fee rule. The reasonableness of the fee should be based on the extent to which
the plaintiff has advanced § 1983s underlying goals, and courts should recognize
thatthisdeterminationhaslittletodowiththesizeofthecompensatoryaward.
ThisArticledevelopstheseideasinthreeparts.PartI providesbackground
information on attorneys feesin§1983litigationbylayingouttheholdingsof
Farrar and the cases that endorse the low award, low fee principle. Part II shows
thatthereliancebythesecourtsonFarrar ismisplacedbecause,inthatcase,a
fragmentedmajorityissuedonlyanambiguousrulingonanarrowissueinapeculiar
fact pattern. Part III proposes an alternative framework for resolving attorneys fees
issues in these low award cases. Starting from the premise that the amount of the
fee should reflect the plaintiffs success atachievingthegoalsof§1983litigation,
itshowsthatthereisnocorrelationbetweentheamountoftheawardandeitherthe
vindicationofrightsorthedeterrenceofviolations.Wefocusontheapplicationof
§1988toconstitutionallitigation,asdistinguishedfrom thestatutoryrightstowhich
thestatutealsoapplies.WedosobecausetheSupremeCourthasdevelopedadis-
tinctivebodyofremediallaw forconstitutionalcases,andthatbodyoflaw hasa
strongbearingoninterpretationofthefeestatuteinthespecificcontextofconstitu-
tionallitigationbroughtunder§1983.24
21 However, the judicial gloss on § 1988, and its legislative history, have constrained that
discretion, in most cases converting the statutes may into a must. Sanchez v. City of Austin,
774F.3d873,880(5thCir.2014)(collectingcases).
22 461U.S.424(1983).
23 Id. at440.
24 Becauseouranalysisstressesconstitutionallitigationunder§1983,ourconclusions
do not necessarily apply to the application of the Attorneys Fees Awards Act to enforce
rightscreatedbyfederalstatutes.Foranargument(moreambitiousthantheoneweadvance)
thatfeesshouldgenerallybeavailabletoplaintiffswhoprevailonthemeritsacrossthewhole
2016] ATTORNEYS FEES,DAMAGES,AND §1983LITIGATION 835
I.SECTION 1983AND THELOW AWARD,LOW FEEPRINCIPLE
Section 1983 provides that every person who violates federal constitutional
rights while acting under color of state law may be held liable by the victim.25The
statutewasenactedaspartoftheCivilRightsActof1871inordertoenforcethe
FourteenthAmendment,butitremainedlargelydormantuntil1961whentheCourt
heldinMonroe v. Pape26thatofficerscanbesuedevenifthereisastate-law remedy
available.27InMonell v. Department of Social Services,28theCourtinterpretedthe
statute to mean that a local government is a person subject to suit underthe
statute.29 ItsaidinLugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.30 thatthedefendantusuallyacts
under color of state law when his conduct meets the state action requirement of
theFourteenthAmendment.31 Thus,notonlylocalgovernmentsandstateofficers
but, on occasion, private individuals doing the states work may be sued.32Remedies
includebothforward-lookingrelieftostopongoingorthreatenedviolationsand
backward-lookingreliefthroughmoneydamagesforviolationsthattookplacein
thepast.Both compensatory33 and punitive34 damagesmaybeawarded against
officersandotherindividuals,butgovernmentsarenotliableforpunitivedamages.35
rangeofstatutorycausesofactiontowhich§1988applies,seeLawrenceD.Rosenthal,Adding
Insult to NoInjury: The Denial of Attorneys Fees to Victorious Employment Discrimina-
tion and Other Civil Rights Plaintiffs,37FLA.ST.U.L.REV.49(2009).
25 42U.S.C.§1983(2012).Section1983readsasfollows:
Everypersonwho,undercolorofanystatute,ordinance,regu-
lation,custom,orusage,ofanyState...subjects,orcausestobe
subjected,anycitizenoftheUnitedStatesorotherpersonwithinthe
jurisdictionthereoftothedeprivationofanyrights,privileges,orim-
munitiessecuredbytheConstitutionandlaws,shallbeliabletothe
partyinjuredinanactionatlaw,suitinequity,orotherproperpro-
ceedingforredress....
Id.
26 365U.S.167(1961).Monroe also held that cities were not persons under the statute
andthereforecouldnotbesuedunder§1983.Id. at191.
27 Id. at167.
28 436U.S.658(1978).Monell thusreversedthecontraryconclusiononthispointthat
wasreachedinMonroe.
29 Id. at701.
30 457U.S.922(1982).
31 Id. at928.
32 InLugar,forexample,aprivatecitizenwhoinvokedastateprejudgmentattachment
procedurerequiringsignificantaidfrom stateofficialswasdeemedtoactundercolorofstate
law.Id. at924.See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 4344 (1988) (questioning whether an
orthopedicsurgeonhiredbythestatetotreat prisoners acts under color of state law).
33 See MemphisCmty.Sch.Dist.v.Stachura,477U.S.299,301(1986);Careyv.Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 25759 (1978).
34 See Smithv.Wade,461U.S.30,31(1983).
35 See CityofNewportv.FactConcerts,Inc.,453U.S.247,271(1981).
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Inordertowinaconstitutionaltortcase,theplaintiffsmustdomorethanprove
violationsoftheirconstitutionalrights.Whenthedefendantisanofficer,hemayraise
a defense of official immunity, which provides legislators,36judges,37prosecutors,38
andwitnesses39 anabsoluteshieldagainstliabilityfordamages.Allotherdefen-
dants, such as police officers, are protected by qualified immunity. They can be
heldliableformoneydamagesonlyiftheirconductviolatedclearlyestablishedcon-
stitutionallaw.40Whenthedefendantisalocalgovernment,theplaintiffwinsonly
if the violation was caused by an official policy or custom of that government.41
Becauseoftheseobstacles,plaintiffswithgoodclaimsontheconstitutionalmerits
willnonethelessgowithoutaremedy.42Unsurprisingly,thesuccessratefor§1983
plaintiffsislowerthanforotherkindsoflitigation.43Thesehurdlesandtheirconse-
quences are relevant to the attorneys fee issue. Section 1983 is aimed at vindicating
constitutionalrightsanddeterringconstitutionalviolations.Section1988isaimed
atmaking§1983aneffectiveremedy.Thesepurposesjustifyageneralprinciplefor
interpreting§1988:unlessthereissomegoodreasonforreadingthestatuteotherwise,
itshouldbeinterpretedinawaythatencourageslawsuitsbyplaintiffswhocansur-
mount the official immunity and policy or custom hurdles.
A. Attorneys Fees and Section 1983 Litigation
The general policy behind fee-shifting legislation like § 1988 is that the pre-
vailingparty,havingbeenadjudgedtobeintheright,shouldnotsufferfinancially
for having to prove the justice of his position.44Inthecontextof§1983litigation,fee
shiftingservesothergoalsbesidesreimbursingtheplaintiffforcostsspenttosecure
hisrights.Theaimsof§1983aretodeterconstitutionalviolationsandvindicate
36 See, e.g.,Boganv.Scott-Harris,523U.S.44,54(1998).
37 See, e.g.,Stumpv.Sparkman,435U.S.349,351,364(1978).
38 See, e.g.,Imblerv.Pachtman,424U.S.409,410(1976).
39 See, e.g.,Rehbergv.Paulk,132S.Ct.1497,1500(2012).
40 See, e.g.,Andersonv.Creighton,483U.S.635,640(1987);Harlowv.Fitzgerald,457
U.S.800,819(1982).
41 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 135960 (2011).
42 See, e.g.,KarenM.Blum,Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Mad-
ness,23WM.& MARY BILL RTS.J.913,914(2015);StephenR.Reinhardt,Essay,The
Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Courts Ever Increasing
Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences,113MICH.L.REV.1219,1245(2015).
43 SeeTheodoreEisenberg,Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation,12J.EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD.4,7(2015).
44 ThomasD.Rowe,Jr.,The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982DUKEL.J.651,654(1982);see also CharlesSilver,Incoherence and Irrationality in
the Law of Attorneys Fees,12REV.LITIG.301,313(1993)(arguingthatlimitingfeeawards
would enable wrongdoers to escape liability for some of the costs [that] their misconduct
entails and have the odd effect of requiring victims (or victims lawyers) to subsidize wrong-
doers by bearing unreimbursed costs).
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constitutional rights. The attorneys fee award has systemic value in encouraging
litigationthatenforcesconstitutionalnormsthataresharedbyeveryone.45Often,the
§1983plaintifflacksresourceswhilethegovernmentorofficialdefendantcande-
pendonpublicfundstoobtainlegalservices.Thus,§1988cansomewhatredress
theimbalanceoflitigationadvantages.Whenthepartiesareonunequalfooting,
holding out the prospect of reimbursement of fees can improve the position and
stiffen the resolve of the relatively weaker side.46
1.SuingOfficersandLocalGovernmentsforConstitutionalViolations
Section1983isthemainstatutoryauthorityforobtainingbothbackward-looking
relief,intheform ofdamages,andforward-lookingrelief,intheform ofinjunctions
anddeclaratoryjudgments,againstmunicipalgovernments,theirofficials,andstate
officialsforfederalconstitutionalviolations.Forward-lookingreliefpresentsfew
remedialobstaclesoncetheplaintiffhasestablishedhisstandingtosueandmet
justiciabilityrequirementssuchasripenessandlackofmootness.Buttherearetwo
big hurdles to recovering damages even when the plaintiffs constitutional rights
have been violated. First, officers may assert official immunity from liability for
damages.Thoseengagedinjudicial,prosecutorial,andlegislativefunctionsare
absolutelyimmunefrom damages.47Thus,aprosecutorwhoknowinglyelicitsfalse
testimonywould beshielded from liability.48 Other officers receive qualified
45 See CatherineR.Albiston& LauraBethNielsen,The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannonfor the Private Attorney General,54UCLA L.REV.
1087, 1088 (2007) (Congress explicitly noted that civil rights enforcement depend[s]
heavily upon private enforcement, and that fee awards are essential if private citizens are
tohaveameaningfulopportunitytovindicatetheimportantCongressionalpolicieswhich
these laws contain. (alteration in original)); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight
for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees,69TEX.L.REV.291,
309 (1990) (stating that Congresss aim was [m]aking more lawyers available for private
enforcement of the nations public interest); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Whats Money Got to Do
with It?: Public Interest Lawyering and Profit,91DENV.U.L.REV. 441, 465 (2014) (For
certainstatutes[including42U.S.C.§1983],theprivateenforcementofwhichCongress
believesservesthepublicinterest,Congresshascreatedjudicialauthoritytoallowprevailing
plaintiffs to receive full attorneys fees from defendants. It is notable that Congress chose not
onlytoencouragepotentialplaintiffstoenforcethesestatutes...butalsospecificallyto
foster representation by skilled attorneys through financial incentives. (footnote omitted));
Rowe,supra note 44, at 662 (discussing attorneys fees in connection with right[s] deemed
to have special social importance).
46 Rowe,supra note 44, at 66364.
47 See, e.g.,Stumpv.Sparkman,435U.S.349(1978)(judicialimmunity);Imblerv.
Pachtman,424U.S.409(1976)(prosecutorialimmunity);Piersonv.Ray,386U.S.547(1967)
(judicialimmunity);Tenneyv.Brandhove,341U.S.367(1951)(legislativeimmunity).
48 See, e.g.,Imbler,424U.S.at439,442.Actionstakeninanadministrativeorinves-
tigative capacity, however, are protected by qualified not absolute immunity. See, e.g.,
Burnsv.Reed,500U.S.478(1991)(givinglegaladvicetopolice).
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immunity, which protects them from paying damages unless they violate clearly
established constitutional rights. Whatever the officers motivation, he avoids lia-
bilitysolongastherightatissueisnotsowell-settledthatareasonableofficer
couldnothavebelievedhewasactingproperly.49
Thesecondhurdleappliestolocalgovernments.Althoughtheydonotenjoyany
immunitydefense,50theycannotbeheldvicariouslyliableforconstitutionalviola-
tionscommittedbytheirofficersandemployees.51Theplaintiffmustshow thatthe
violation was caused by official policy or custom, which generaly requires either
aformallegislativeactbythemunicipalgovernment,awidespreadpracticeamounting
to a custom, a ruling by the municipalitys final policy maker on the issue at hand,52
or training or hiring of officers that is so inadequate as to demonstrate deliberate
indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights on the part of official policymakers.53
Therealworldimpactofthesetwohurdlesisthatmanyplaintiffslose,eventhough
theycanprovethatofficersviolatedtheirconstitutionalrights.Few suitsagainst
localgovernmentssucceed,andplaintiffssuingofficialsonlywinwhentheycan
provenotonlyconstitutionalviolations,butalsothatanyreasonableofficialwould
know that the contested conduct would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
2. The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976
The Courts rulings in Monroe andMonell wereemblematicofjudicialand
legislativeexpansionsofcivilrightsandremediesinthe1960sand1970s.TheCourt
extendedthereachoftheBilofRightsandtheFourteenthAmendment,whileCon-
gressenactedsuchstatutesastheCivilRightsActof1964,54theVotingRightsAct
of1965,55andtheTitleIXprotectionsagainstgenderdiscriminationin1972.56Some
49 See, e.g.,Wilsonv.Layne,526U.S.603(1999).Allowingreporterstoaccompany
policewhentheyenteredaprivatehometoexecuteanarrestwarrantwasaviolationofthe
Fourth Amendment; however, this right had not been clearly established at the time of the
event,sothedefendantswereprotectedbyqualifiedimmunity.Id. at 60506.
50 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 63744 (1980).
51 See Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 69293 n.57, 70708 (1978).
52 ThemainSupremeCourtcasesonthispointareJettv.Dall.Indep.Sch.Dist.,491U.S.
701(1989);CityofSt.Louisv.Praprotnik,485U.S.112(1988);andPembaurv.Cityof
Cincinnati,475U.S.469(1986).
53 The leading cases on failure to train are Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011),
andCityofCantonv.Harris,489U.S.378(1989).ThehiringcontextisaddressedinBd.of
the Cty. Commrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), which suggeststhepossibilityofappli-
cation of the deliberate indifference standard to hiring, but denies it in this case.
54 See Pub.L.No.88-352,78Stat.241(1964)(codifiedasamendedat42U.S.C.§2000a
et. seq. (2012)).
55 See Pub.L.No.89-110,79Stat.437(1965)(codifiedasamendedat52U.S.C.§§10301-
14,10501-08,10701-02(2012)).
56 See Pub.L.No.92-318,86Stat.235(1972)(codifiedasamendedat42U.S.C.§§2000c,
2000c-6,2000c-9,2000h-2(2012)).
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ofthesestatutes,suchasTitleVII oftheCivilRightsActof1964,authorizedawards
of attorneys fees to successful plaintiffs. There is no such authorization in § 1983.57
Butwhenplaintiffssuedtoenforce§1983andotherlawsprotectingbroadpublic
interests, lower courts, invoking principles of equity, began granting attorneys fees
in these cases as wel, despite the American Rule to the contrary and the absence of
specificlegislativelanguagecarvingoutanexception.In1975,theSupremeCourt
putastoptothatpractice.ItsaidinAlyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society58thatfeescouldbeshiftedonlyifauthorizedbyCongress.59
In response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of
1976,60 which, according to the Senate Report on the legislation, remedies gaps in
thelanguageofthesecivilrightslawsby providing thespecificauthorization
requiredbytheCourtinAlyeska, and makes our civil rights laws consistent.61Thus,
thestatutespecifiesthatfeesmaybeawardedtoprevailingpartiesin§1983cases
andinlitigationunderothercivilrightsstatutes.TheSenateReportindicatesthat
the standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,62 andthecourtshavegenerallyfollowedthatguid-
ance.63Thus,thestatuteisreadinlightofthecaselaw precedingitsenactmentand
itsremedialpurposes.Forexample,despitethestatutorylanguageauthorizingan
award to a prevailing party, defendants are typically granted fees only in frivolous
lawsuits,asneitherpriorpracticenorthestatutorypurposesupportsuchawards.64
The most important Supreme Court case bearing on what constitutes a reason-
able fee award under the statute is Hensley v. Eckerhart,acaseinwhichtherewere
multipledefendantsandmultipletheories.65Theplaintiffprevailedonsomeclaims
andlostonothers.TheCourtsetoutguidelinesfordetermininganappropriatefee.
57 42U.S.C.§1983(2012).
58 421U.S.240(1975).
59 See id. at 271 ([I]t is not for us to invade the legislatures province by redistributing
litigation costs . . . .).
60 See 42U.S.C.§1988.
61 S.REP.NO.94-1011,at5(1976).
62 Id.
63 One notable instance in which legislative intent has trumped plain language in guiding
the Courts interpretation of the fee statute involves fees awarded to prevailing defendants.
The statute itself authorizes a fee award to the prevailing party without distinguishing
betweenplaintiffsanddefendants.42U.S.C.§1988(b).TheSenateReportexplicitlystates,
however, that prevailing defendants should be awarded fees only when the plaintiffs suit
was frivolous or brought in bad faith. S.REP.NO.94-1011,at5.TheSupremeCourthas
construed § 1988 to authorize an award of attorneys fees to a prevailing defendant only
where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.
Hensleyv.Eckerhart,461U.S.424,429n.2(1983).
64 See, e.g.,Cooneyv.Casady,735F.3d514,521(7thCir.2013).
65 461U.S.at426.See generally DanB.Dobbs,Reducing Attorneys Fees for Partial
Success: A Comment on Hensleyand Blum,1986WIS.L.REV.835(1986)(discussing
Hensley andtheissuesitraised).
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It said that courts should begin by calculating the lodestar, which consists of
determining the reasonable number of hours spent on the litigation by the plaintiffs
lawyersandmultiplyingthatbyareasonablehourlyfee.66Thelawyersshouldkeep
recordsoftheirtimeandhow itwasspent,andhoursspentonunsuccessfulunre-
latedorirrelevantclaims(suchastimespentexclusivelyonstatelaw issues)should
beexcluded.67Whenplaintiffswinonsomeconstitutionalclaimsandloseonothers,
timespentontheunsuccessfultheoriesofrecoveryshouldnotbeincludedinthefee
awardiftheunsuccessfultheoriesareunrelatedtotheclaimsonwhichtheplaintiff
didprevail.68Thereasonablehourlyfeeisonethatreflectswhatlawyersofsimilar
skillandexperiencewouldchargeonmattersofsimilardifficulty,whetherinthe
civilrightscontextorsomeothertypeoflitigation.69 Inalatercase,theCourtre-
versedafeeawardinwhichthedistrictcourtincreasedtheawardabovethelodestar
onaccountoftheextraordinarysuccessachievedbythelitigant.70
II.FARRAR V. HOBBY AND THENO/LOW DAMAGESPROBLEM
InHensley,theCourtsaidthatfallingshortofcompletesuccessisalegitimate
reasontodeductfrom thelodestarincalculatingthefeeaward.71 Questionsthen
aroseastohow thatprincipleshouldbeappliedwhentheplaintiffwononthemerits
ofhisconstitutionalclaim butobtainedlessindamagesthanhehadsought.The
SupremeCourtaddressedthisissueinFarrar v. Hobby.72 Farrar,theownerofa
privateschool,wasinvestigatedbystateofficials,includingLieutenantGovernor
William Hobby.73Theschoolwentbankrupt,andFarrarsuedunder§1983seeking
$17millionincompensatorydamages.74Hechargedthattheinvestigationviolated
hisconstitutionalrightsandledtothebankruptcy.75A juryfoundthatsomeofthe
officialshadconspiredagainstFarrar,butthatHobbywasnotoneoftheconspira-
tors, and, in any event, the conspiracy was not a proximate cause of Farrars injury.76
66 Hensley,461U.S.at433.
67 Id. at 43435, 440.
68 Id. at435.Whatclaimsareandarenotrelatedisoftenamatterofjudgment.See, e.g.,
Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 124647 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the equal protection
and excessive force claims were related, as they pertained to a single event (an arrest), and
that the equal protection claim was not related to the malicious prosecutionclaim because
theprosecutiontookplaceatalaterpointintime).
69 See, e.g.,Gonzalezv.CityofMaywood,729F.3d1196,1206,1209(9thCir.2013)
(applyingHensley).
70 See Perduev.KennyA.,559U.S.542,546(2010).
71 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 43537.
72 506U.S.103(1992).ForadiscussionofFarrar,seeJoelH.Troter,Note,The Catalyst
Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After Farrarv.Hobby,80VA.L.REV.1429(1994).
73 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 10506.
74 Id. at106.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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It also found that Hobby violated Farrars civil rights, but that Hobbys conduct was
not a proximate cause of any damages suffered by Farrar.77Thedistrictcourtentered
ajudgmentthatFarrartakenothingandthattheactionbedismissedwitheachparty
bearinghisowncosts.78Onaninitialappeal,theFifthCircuitheldthatFarrarwas
entitledtoajudgmentfornominaldamages.79Thedistrictcourtsubsequentlyentered
such a judgment and then awarded Farrar over $300,000 in attorneys fees and ex-
penses.80 TheFifthCircuitreversedthefeeaward,rulingthatFarrarwasnota
prevailing party, despite the entry of judgment in his favor for nominal damages.81
Because§1988authorizesattorneys fees only to prevailing parties, he was not
entitledtofees.82
TheSupremeCourtgrantedcertioraritodecidewhetheraplaintiffwhorecovers
nominal damages is a prevailing party for purposes of awarding atorneys fees.83Inan
opinionbyJusticeThomas,theCourtreversedtheFifthCircuit,withalnineJustices
agreeingthatFarrarwasindeedaprevailingparty.84Afterexaminingitsprecedents,
the Court said that a plaintiff prevails when actual relief on the merits of his claim
materialy alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendants
behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.85Anawardofnominaldamages,
byrequiringthedefendanttopayonedollartotheplaintiff,satisfiesthistest.86
TheCourtwentontoaddressanissuenotpresentedbythepetitionforcertio-
rari the calculation of a reasonable fee for a plaintiff like Farrar.87 On this
reasonable fee issue, or rather on the question of whether the issue should have
been addressed at all, the Court split 54.88JusticeThomas,writingforthemajority,
concludedthattheonlyreasonablefeeinthiscasewasnofeeatall.89 Thestarting
pointofhisanalysiswasthepropositionestablishedinHensley that the degree of
the plaintiffs overall success goes to the reasonableness of a fee award.90Under
thistest,JusticeThomasreasoned,Hensley callsnotonlyforareductioninthefee
award, but for no attorneys fee at all.91 Theproblem wasthatFarrarandhis
associates received nominal damages insteadofthe$17millionincompensatory
77 Id.
78 Id. at 10607.
79 Id. at107.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 10708.
82 Id.
83 Id. at105.
84 Id. at 11213.
85 Id. at 11112.
86 Id. at 11213.
87 Id. at114.
88 Id. at123(White,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart).
89 Id. at 11516 (majority opinion).
90 Id. at 114 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Assnv.GarlandIndep.Sch.Dist.,489U.S.
782,793(1989)).
91 Id. at115.
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damages that they sought.92 In addition, [t]his litigation accomplished little beyond
giving petitioners the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded
that [their] rights had been violated in some unspecified way.93 Farrarhadat-
tempted, and failed, to prove actual, compensable injury caused by the unspecified
constitutionalviolation.94Notethatthesereasonscenteronthecircumstancesofthis
particular litigation Farrars ambitions in the litigation, the gap between his
aspirationsandhislevelofsuccess,andthereasonforthatgap.Despitethefocus
on the distinctive features of Farrars lawsuit, Justice Thomas concluded by abstract-
ing away from the facts of the case, stating a seemingly general principle for low
award, low fee cases: When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his
failuretoprovean essentialelementofhisclaim formonetaryrelief,theonly
reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.95
Butthisbroadprinciplecannotfairlybetreatedasablackletterrulestatingthe
currentlaw.Ithasnotearneduniversal,orevengeneral,endorsementbythelower
courts,andtheSupremeCourthasneverreversedanyofthecasesthatrejectit.
Therearefourreasonstodoubtthesturdinessofthissweepingprinciple.Oneisthat
the Courts own articulation of it contains seeds of uncertainty. Thus, it is not in
everycasethatnominaldamagesgetnofee,butonlywhenthereasonforthenominal
award is failure to prove an essential element . . . for monetary relief.96Arethere
casesinwhichthereasonissomethingotherthanthisfailureofproof?Ifnot,what
isthepointofthisclause?Ifso,whatarethosesituations?Moreover,theprinciple
doesnoteven applyto everycasein which nominaldamagesareawarded on
account of failure to prove an essential element. Rather, no fee is usually the
appropriateaward.Whataretheexceptions,andwhy?
Second, Justice OConnor concurred and provided the decisive fifth vote. She
joinedthemajorityopinioninFarrar butwroteseparatelytoprovidepartialanswers,
at least the ones she would give, to the questions raised by the majoritys general prin-
ciple.97 She pointed out that not . . . all nominaldamagesawardsarede minimus.98
Thus, nominal damages would sometimes support a fee. For Justice OConnor,
relevant factors included the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff
claimstohaveprevailed, and whether the litigation accomplished some public goal
other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and client.99Bringing
thesefactorstobearontheissuebeforetheCourtinFarrar, one searches these
facts in vain for the public purpose this litigation might have served.100
92 Id. at114.
93 Id. (alterationinoriginal).
94 Id. at115.
95 Id. (citationomitted).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 116 (OConnor, J., concurring).
98 Id. at121.
99 Id. at 12122.
100 Id. at122.
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Third,fourJusticesdissentedinpart.101Theyagreedthatbysecuringanaward
ofnominaldamages,Farrarwasaprevailingparty.102Intheirview,prevailingparty
statuswastheonlyissuebeforetheCourt.103 Thecourtofappealsdidnotaddress
whatfeewouldbereasonableifFarrarwasdeemedtobeaprevailingparty,norwas
thatissueraisedinthepetitionforcertiorariorbriefedbytheparties.104 Conse-
quently,thedissenterswrotethattheCourtshouldnotaddressthatquestion.Intheir
view,thecaseshouldberemandedtotheFifthCircuitforitsconsiderationofhow
theHensley factorsshouldbearontheamountofthefeeaward.105
Fourth,theview takenbythedissentersisvalidatedbythecircumstancesofthe
Farrar litigation.Therecordin Farrar wasnotsuchtoallow forathoughtful
considerationofthebroadquestionofwhatisareasonablefeewhentheplaintiff
prevailsbutisawardedonlynominaldamages.Therecordwasdeficientintwo
respects.First,the jury findingswerenotclear.106 Thecomplaintalleged that
LieutenantGovernorHobbydeprivedFarraroflibertyandpropertywithoutdue
processbymeansofconspiracyandmaliciousprosecution.107Inresponsetospecial
interrogatories,thejuryfound thatHobbywastheonlydefendantwhodidnot
conspireagainstFarrar.108 Yet,italsofoundthatHobbydiddepriveFarrarofan
unspecified civil right.109 Finally, the jury found that Hobbys conduct was not the
proximatecauseofanydamages.110 What does all this mean? What civil right did
HobbydepriveFarrar?Ifothers,butnotHobby,conspiredtoharm Farrar,exactly
how did Hobby violate Farrars constitutional rights?111 Giventhevaguenessof
thesejuryfindings,Farrar isapoorvehiclethroughwhichtodeclareabroadrule
regardingfeeawardsinnominaldamagescases.
TheseconddeficiencyistheobviousonepointedoutbythedissentingJustices
inFarrar.ThesoleissuepresentedtotheCourtwaswhetheraplaintiffwhosecures
ajudgmentfornominaldamagesisaprevailingpartywithinthemeaningofthe
attorneys fees statute.112 Thequestionofwhatfeewouldbereasonableunderthe
factsofthiscasewasnotaddressedbytheCourtofAppeals,wasnotpresentedin
thepetitionforcertiorari,andwasnotbriefedbythepetitioners.113 Ifthecasehad
101 See generally id. at122(White,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart).
102 Id. at123.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at124.
106 Id. at106(majorityopinion).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 These questions were not addressed in Farrars initial appeal. The Fifth Circuit held
that, given a finding that Hobby violated a civil right of Farrar, an award of nominal damages
wasrequired.Farrarv.Cain,756F.2d1148,1149(5thCir.1985).
112 Farrar,506U.S.at105.
113 Id. at123(White,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart).
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beenremandedforfurtherproceedingsassuggestedbythedissent,thedistrictcourt
wouldhavebeengiventhefirstopportunitytopassonwhatwouldbeareasonable
fee,ifany.Thepartieswouldhavebeengiventheopportunitytofullybriefand
arguetheirpositions.Thedistrictcourtwouldultimatelyhaveruledonthefeeappli-
cation and provided an explanation for its decision. Quite possibly, the district courts
rulingwouldhavebeenappealedtothecircuitcourt.Clearly,suchaprocedure
wouldhaveproducedamorefullydevelopedrecordthantherecordbeforetheCourt
inFarrar andwouldhaveprovidedafirmerbasisforproclaimingageneralprinci-
plegoverningfeeawardsinnominaldamagescases.
A. Farrars Progeny
AfterFarrar,thequestionfacingthelowercourtswashow broadlyornarrowly
to read the Courts opinion. Does the case stand for a broad, general rule against
awarding attorneys fees when the plaintiff prevails but recovers only nominal and
low compensatorydamages?Orisitbetterunderstoodasanarrowerruleapplicable
onlytocasesfactuallysimilartoFarrar,inwhichtheplaintiffisunabletoshow a
causallinkbetweentheviolationandtheharm forwhichheseeksredress?Although
lowercourtshavedividedontheanswertothisquestioninthetwodecadessince
Farrar,114 severalrecentcircuitcourtopinionssuggestatrendtowardthebroader
reading.Wefocusouranalysisonthissetofcasesratherthanthosethattakeour
side,becausetheyrequirearesponse,andthecaseswhichawardfeesinsuchcir-
cumstancesdonotprovideone.
UndeterredbytheproblemswithabroadreadingofFarrar, the low award, low
fee cases merely cite Farrar as authority without pausing over the gaps in the Courts
reasoning.Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic providesthebestrecentillustrationof
thisapproach.115 Theincidentgivingrisetothis§1983suitbeganwhenGray,a
nine-year-oldstudentinaphysicaleducationclass,quarreledwithherinstructor
overhereffortsatperformingjumpingjacks.116 Bostic,adeputysheriffservingas
aschoolresourceofficer,waspresentatthetime.117Heintervenedandhandcuffed
Gray, whom the opinion describes at one point as arguably compliant and, at another
point, as compliant.118 The handcuffs were on for less than 60 seconds, accord-
ing to Bostics testimony.119Graysuedonavarietyofconstitutional,statutory,and
statelaw grounds,namingBosticandtenotherofficersasdefendants.120 Inearlier
114 See supra notes 1718 and accompanying text.
115 720 F.3d 887, 89394 (11th Cir. 2013).
116 Id. at889.
117 Id.
118 Id. at890,896.
119 Id. at890.A discussionoftheincidentgivingrisetothelitigationisfoundatGrayex
rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 130002 (11th Cir. 2006).
120 Gray,720F.3dat890.
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proceedings,theclaimsagainstallbutBosticandoneotherdefendantwerequickly
dismissed.121 GrayultimatelyprevailedagainstBostic,showingthatheviolatedher
FourthAmendmentrightagainstunreasonableseizure.122Moreover,itwasfoundthat
Bosticwasnotentitledtoqualifiedimmunity,asitwasclearlyestablishedatthetime
of this incident that an officer who handcuffs a compliant nine-year-old child for
purelypunitivepurposeshasunreasonablyseizedthechildinviolationoftheFourth
Amendment.123Thejuryawardednominaldamagesofonedollar.124
ThedistrictcourtultimatelygrantedGray $39,900 in attorneys fees and ex-
penses.125 By a 21 vote, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that no
feeshouldhavebeenawarded.126 Themajoritysaidthat,underFarrar, the most
critical factor in determining the reasonableness of an attorneys fee award is the
degree of success obtained, and nominal damages are sufficient to establish the de
minimis nature of Grays victory.127 Evidently,Grayhadaskedfor$25,000in
compensatorydamages.128 ThecourtcomparedthecasetoFarrar: True, she did
notseek$17million.Butthedifferenceremainssubstantialbetweenthe$25,000
that she sought and the nominal award she received.129Thecourtthenaddressedthe
additional two factors suggested by Justice OConnor.130 On the significance of the
legal issue, it treated the fact that immunity was not available as a ground for
minimizing the significance of the ruling in Grays favor: [S]ince every objectively
reasonable officer would have known that Bostics conduct violated the Constitu-
tion,thenthesignificanceofthecaseasaprecedentialexampleisgreatlydimin-
ished.131 The public purpose served factor principally relates to whether the
victory vindicates important rights and deters future violations.132 Grays case failed
this test because it is clear that Gray commenced the litigation to redress private
injury, and [that] it does not serve a public purpose, because Gray was unable to
establish that she suffered actual injury, and because she specifically sought, but
failed to obtain, punitive damages and injunctive relief.133
Severalotherrecentcasesmanifestthesamereluctancetoawardasignificantfee
whenthecompensatorydamagesfallshortofwhattheplaintiffsought.Theplaintiff
121 Id.
122 Id. at891(citingGray, 458 F.3d at 130607).
123 Id. at892.
124 Id. at891.
125 Id. at893.
126 Id. at 899900.
127 Id. at894.
128 Id. at895.
129 Id.
130 Id. at894.
131 Id. at896.
132 Id. at897.
133 Id. at899.
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inAponte v. City of Chicago134successfullysuedforillegalsearchandseizureand
askedfor$25,000incompensatorydamagesand$100,000inpunitivedamages,but
recoveredonly$100againstoneofeightdefendants.135 Hesought$116,437.50in
fees.136 In affirming the district courts rejection of his fee, the Seventh Circuit panel
reliedonwhatitcalledFarrars aiming high and fell far short factor.137InMcAfee
v. Boczar,138 theplaintiffsuedBoczar,ananimalcontrolofficer,forfalsearrestin
violationofherFourthAmendmentrightsandobtainedacompensatoryawardof
$2,943.60thatcoveredherout-of-pocketexpensesbutnothingmore.139Thedistrict
court authorized attorneys fees of $322,340.50.140Notingthattheplaintiffhadsug-
gestedtothejurythata$500,000compensatoryawardwouldbeappropriateand
hadsoughtpunitivedamagesaswell,theFourthCircuitreducedthefeeawardto
$100,000onaccountofthegapbetweenwhatwassoughtandwhatwasobtained.141
Richardson v. City of Chicago142addsanotherwrinkletothedoctrine.Plaintiff
suedforbeingshotatbyanoff-dutyofficer.143Herecoveredonedollarinnominal
damagesbutalsoreceived$3,000inpunitivedamages.144 Thoughsmall,thepuni-
tive award made a big difference in the courts attorneys fee determination.145Using
the lodestar, his lawyer sought $675,000 in fees, but the district judge reduced this
to $123,000.146 TheSeventh Circuitaffirmed,stressing the$3,000 in punitive
damages.147 Absentpunitivedamages, under Farrar an award of attorneys fees
would be un-warranted.148 Thisstatementimpliesthereisavirtuallycategorical
rule prohibiting an award of attorneys fees when a civil rights plaintiff succeeds in
establishingaconstitutionalviolationbutreceivesonlynominaldamages.
134 728F.3d724(7thCir.2013).
135 Id. at726.
136 Id.
137 Id. at729.
138 738F.3d81(4thCir.2013).
139 Id. at 8485.
140 Id. at86.
141 Id. at93,95.
142 740F.3d1099(7thCir.2014).
143 Id. at1101.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 110304.
148 Id. at1101.See also Winston v. OBrien, 773 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2014) (granting a
feeawardof$187,467supportedbyajudgmentof$1innominaldamagesand$7,500in
punitivedamages);DeJesusNazariov.MorrisRodriguez,554F.3d196,202(1stCir.2009)
(noting that a punitive damage award will support attorneys fees); Mendez v. County of San
Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (When, as here, the plaintiff wins punitive
damages, the award of punitive damages alone is sufficient to take it out of the nominal
category. (quoting Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644,648 (9th Cir.2005)),
overruled in part by Arizonav.ASARCO LLC,773F.3d1050(9thCir.2014).
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1. The Case Against Low Award, Low Fee
Gray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson allstartfrom thepremisethatthepri-
mary, if not exclusive, test for determining a reasonable attorneys fee in a § 1983
suitfordamagesisthesizeofthecompensatoryaward.Althoughitisnotimplausi-
bletoreadFarrar as standing for this low award, low fee principle, these cases
beliethecontinuingdivisionamonglowercourtsonhow Farrar shouldbeapplied.149
The split among lower courts is hardly surprising, as Justice Thomass opinion in
Farrar is hardly unambiguous. The award/fee issue was poorly framed in the Su-
premeCourtbecausethelowercourtshadnotadjudicatedit.Perhapsforthatreason,
the Courts reasoning on the damages/fee relationship is terse and fragmentary.
InFarrar,theCourtdealtwithadistinctivesetoffactsandjustifieditsruling
byreasonsthatfocusedsolelyonthosefacts.150 Theopiniondoesnotaddressthe
broaderquestionsofwhenandwhyalow awardmayjustifyareducedfeeina
§1983case.151 Gray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson puttoomuchweightona
single adverb by emphasizing the Courts assertion that nominal damages usually
warrant no fee. Even on its facts, the low award, low fee holding won only five
votes,152 and it was accompanied by a concurring opinion from Justice OConnor
that rejected an unqualified endorsement of the low fee, low award holding.153In
sum,Farrar issusceptibletoanarrowerreading,onethatfocuseslessonthedisparity
betweendamagessoughtandthoseawardedandmoreonthereasonswhynominal
orlow damageswereawarded.Thegeneralissueoftherelationbetweentheaward
andthefeedeservesgreaterattentionthanitreceivedeitherinFarrar orinthelower
courtcasesthatattemptedtoapplyit.
Inourview,Gray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson gotoofarinthedirection
of limiting fees when they adopt the low award, low fee reading of Farrar asa
general guide for resolving attorneys fee issues in nominal and low damages cases.
Ourpointisnotthateveryplaintiffwhoachievesevenaminimalvictoryisentitled
toafullfee.Futile,spiteful,andwastefullitigationimposescostsonthejudicial
system andthelargersociety.Itmaysubtlyundermineeffectiveenforcementof
constitutionalrightsbydivertingresourcesfrom meritoriousconstitutionallitiga-
tion.154 The Attorneys Fees Awards Act provides means for taking these costs into
account. It accords some discretion to the district judge, who may award a fee, and
it authorizes only a reasonable fee.155Thesocialcostsofmisguidedlitigationare
149 Forcasesontheothersideofthesplit,seesupra note21andaccompanyingtext.
150 506 U.S. 103, 11416 (1992).
151 See id.
152 Id. at104.
153 Id. at 12022 (OConnor, J., concurring).
154 See LauraE.Flenniken,Comment,No More Plain Meaning: Farrarv.Hobby,71
DENV.U.L.REV. 477, 48889 (1994).
155 Justice OConnor understood the Court as holding that the de minimis ortechnical
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illustrated by the Courts impatience with the Farrar plaintiffs,whoobligedtheCourt
andtheiradversariestodevotehugeresourcestolitigatingadoomedtheory.Itdoes
notfollow from Farrar thatno nominalorlow awarddeservesasubstantialfee.
Therearedifferencesamongconstitutionaltortcasesthatresultinnominaldamages.
Someofthem doachieveworthygoals,eveniftheFarrar litigationdidnot.
Ourargument,inanutshell,isthatGray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson draw
anillusorydistinctionbetweennominalandlow awardcasesontheonehandand
substantialcompensatorydamagescasesontheother.Thesecourtsmakeamistake
whentheyusetheHensley/Farrar discussion of success as their test for determin-
ingareasonablefeeinnominalandlow damagescases.Whethertheplaintiffde-
servesafeedependsonwhethertheoutcomeofthelitigationachievesthepurposes
ofconstitutionaltortlaw under§1983.Thosegoalsarevindicationofconstitutional
rights and deterrence of constitutional violations. A technical victory like the one
inFarrar doesnotfurtherthosegoals.Norarevindicationanddeterrencepromoted
byalossagainstoneofseveraldefendantsorononeofseveralunrelatedtheories,
evenifaccompaniedbyvictoryonothers.ThatisthepointofHensley.156 Butvin-
dicationanddeterrenceareserved,atleasttosomeextent,bysuitsinwhichplain-
tiffswinonthemeritsandobtainsmallornominaldamagesmerelybecausethey
cannotprovesubstantialcompensatorydamages.
Subsection A gives reasons for rejecting the premise that success, as measured
by the amount awarded, should be the legal test for whether an attorneys fee is
justified under the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act. Success is not a
statutorynorm fordeterminingwhenafeeawardisjustified.AsusedinHensley and
Farrar, it is descriptive. Lack of success describes what the plaintiff achieved in
Farrar,157 and partialsuccessdescribesthe outcome in Hensley.158 ButGray,
Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson attempttodraw from thosecasesageneralprinci-
plethatfeesdependonsuccess,andthatsuccessdependsonamountreceived.In
doingso,theyignorethevindicationanddeterrenceaimsofthestatute.Thoseaims
oughttoguideitsinterpretationandapplication.
SubsectionB turnstothoseaims.Itdemonstratesthatintheuniverseofcasesin
which the plaintiffs only shortcoming is failure to prove substantial compensatory
damages,constitutionalrightsare,atleasttosomeextent,vindicatedbynominaldam-
agesandthatconstitutionalviolationsmaybedeterred.Ifthedeterrentimpactisnot
asgreatasinthecaseofasubstantialaward,itisnotinconsequential.Asforvin-
dication,itisamistaketofocussolelyontheamountoftheawardandrushtothe
conclusionthatrightshavenotbeenvindicated,eventhoughtheplaintiffprevailed
onthemerits.ThatmaybetrueinacaselikeFarrar,inwhichtheplaintiffcannot
victory exclusion . . . is part of the determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee. See
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 117 (OConnor, J. concurring).
156 See generally 461U.S.424(1982).
157 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 11617.
158 Hensley,461U.S.at440.
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show thatthelargelossforwhichheseeksredresswasnotcausedbytheviolation
heisabletoestablish.But,incaseslikeGray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson,the
explanation for the low fee is more likely the Courts rules on damages for constitu-
tionaltorts,whichrequirejuriestoadheretoprinciplesdrawnfrom thecommonlaw
oftortsandforbidanawardforthevalueofconstitutionalrights.Inthisregime,a
nominalawardmayvindicatetherightasmuchasonecanrealisticallyexpect.
Subsection C compares the attorneys fee issue for nominal damages cases with
the Courts approach to attorneys fees for other constitutional remedies. Denying
a fee for nominal damages is at odds with the Courts attorneys fee doctrine in suits
forprospectivereliefforconstitutionalviolations.Inthatcontext,plaintiffswhowin
onthemerits,obtainfeeswithoutanyfurtherinquiryintothesignificanceoftheirvic-
tories,incontrasttotheapproachfolowedbyGray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson
indamagescases.Yet,theunderlyingaim of§1983istoprovideeffectiveremedies
forconstitutionalviolations,bothpastandfuture.Thesecasesdraw anarbitrary
distinction between attorneys fees for prospective and retrospective relief, as there
isnojustificationforsuchagapbetweenthetwosetsofplaintiffs.
SubsectionD connectsthediscussionofconstitutionalremediesandtheirpur-
posestotheissueofstatutoryinterpretationraisedbylow damagescases.Theultimate
issue is the proper reading of the Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, a broadly
wordedandbriefstatutethatprovidesnointernalguidanceastowhatcountsasa
reasonable fee. All of the foregoing three considerations have force if, and to the
extent,theyhelpinarrivingatthebestinterpretationofthatstatute.Neitherthe
disregardforvindicationanddeterrenceasgoalsofconstitutionaltortnortheim-
plicitdistinctionbetweenpastandfutureviolationsiscompatiblewiththestatedaim
ofthatstatute,whichistoencouragelawyerstotakethesecases,soastobetter
enforceconstitutionalandotherfederalrights.159
a. Success
The fee statute authorizes a reasonable attorneys fee to a prevailing plain-
tiff.160IndeterminingthereasonablenessofanawardinHensley,theissuewashow
thisstatutoryterm shouldbeappliedtocasesinwhichtheplaintiffsuedmorethan
onedefendantorraisedmorethanoneclaim.161 The Court said that the most critical
factor is the degree of success obtained.162 The Court also said that the plaintiffs at-
torneyshouldkeepdetailedrecordsoftimespentondifferentclaims.163Totheextent
thathoursspentonthewinningissueareunrelatedtothosedevotedtothelosing
159 See S.REP.NO.94-1011,at2(1976).
160 42U.S.C.§1988(b)(2012).
161 461U.S.at426.
162 Id. at436.
163 Id. at437.
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issue,aplaintiffshouldreceiveafeefortheformer,butnotthelatter.164InFarrar,
theplaintiffsuedseveraldefendantsfor$17million,claimingthattheiractionshad
destroyedtheeconomicvalueofaschoolheowned.165Thejuryfoundthatoneofthe
defendants had violated Farrars unspecified civil right, but it also found that the
violationdidnotcausetheloss.166Forthisreason,Farrarwasawardedonlynominal
damages.ApplyingHensleys success factor, the Court denied an attorneys fee.167
Both cases are plausible interpretations of the Attorneys Fees Awards Act. The
fee statutes goal of encouraging litigation to enforce constitutional rights is not served
byauthorizingafeefortheunrelatedlosingclaims.Thus,anamountthatexcludes
those claims seems to satisfy the statutes directive that a reasonable fee may be
awarded.168 Few woulddenythatlackofsuccessisanaccuratewaytodescribea
lossontheconstitutionalmeritsoronfailuretoshow acausalconnectionbetween
theconstitutionalviolation andthedamageincurred.Farrar istypicalofmuch
contemporarytortlitigation,inwhichthemainpointofdisputeisoftentheamount
of damages. Thus, [w]hen liability is clear, both sides will judge their success by
the size of the verdict.169 Typically,lackofclarityaboutliabilitywillencourage
bothsidestopursuesettlement,againputtingthefocusontheamountofdamages
theuncertainclaim isworth.Clarityaboutliabilitywilloftenbelackingbecausethe
case is governed by the jurys decision as to reasonableness undernegligencelaw
or the jurys evaluation of defect in a product liability case, the preemptive impact
offederallaw willbehardtoassess,orforsomeotherreason.Atthesametime,the
complexityofmuchtortlitigationassuresthatnolawyerwillundertakethecase,
especiallyonacontingencyfeebasis,unlessthepotentialliabilityissubstantial,
onceagainputtingthefocusontheamountofdamages.
TakingHensley andFarrar astheirstartingpoint,courtsdenyingfeesfornominal
damageshavereasonedthattheseplaintiffs,likeFarrar,haveachievedlittlesuccess.
This definition of success drives the courts reasoning in Gray,McAfee,andother
similar cases. These courts focus on success is understandable. Litigation consumes
resourcesthatcouldhavegonetootheruses.Futileorpointlesslitigationwastes
resources and should not be encouraged. It would be fatuous to read the Attorneys
FeesAwardsActinawaythatpaysnoattentiontowhetheragivenexpenditureof
164 Id. at 43435.
165 Farrarv.Hobby,506U.S.103,106(1992).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 11416.
168 Theonlyquibbleonthispointisthat,inFarrar, there is a case for an attorneys fee
forthetimespentonthevictoriousclaim againstHobbyifthatclaim canbeidentifiedand
ifthehoursspentonitcanbesegregated.Id. at114.Therecordseemstobemurky,andthe
dissenthasavalidpointinarguingthatthecaseshouldhavebeensentbackforfurtherpro-
ceedingsonthatissue.Id. at 12324 (White, J., dissenting).
169 RICHARD A.EPSTEIN & CATHERINEM.SHARKEY,CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
843(10thed.2012).
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lawyer time and energy was constructive or not. The success/failure distinction
canmeasuretheutilityofagivenpieceoflitigation.
But there is a difference between the question of whether success counts and
the question of how success should be defined. The danger lies in putting too
much emphasis on litigation success, and then measuring success by the amount
ofmoneyawarded,asthoughconstitutionaltortswerelikeanyothertypeoftort
litigation.Unlesscourtspayattentiontothedistinctivefeaturesofconstitutionaltort
law,theywillgiveshortshrifttotheissuesofstatutoryinterpretationandapplica-
tion presented by requests for attorneysfeesin§1983cases.Onaccountofthe
prominence given toward success in Hensley andFarrar,theterm willprobably
continue to figure in atorneys fees litigation. That is all the more reason to take care
indefiningit.Success,orthelackofit,alwaysdependsonwhatoneistryingto
achieve.Inapplyingthestandardsof§1988todecidefeeissuesin§1983litigation,
the relevant question is how well the plaintiffs lawsuit furthered the goals of con-
stitutionaltortlaw.Inanygivencase,theinquiryoughttobewhetherthevindication
anddeterrencegoalsofconstitutionaltortlaw wereservedbythelitigation.Ifthey
were, then the plaintiff has succeeded and a fee is justified, even if the damages
arenominal.
Inmakingthatinquiry,itisimportanttopayattentiontothedistinctivefeatures
ofmostnominaldamagescasesforconstitutionaltorts.Therearedifferencesbe-
tweenHensley,Farrar,andmuchcontemporarytortlitigationontheonehandand
oursetofconstitutionaltortnominaldamagescasesontheother.Weareconcerned
withcasesinwhichtheobjectiontoafeeisnotlackofcausalconnectionbetween
violationandlegallyrecognizeddamagebutsolelythattheplaintiffhasfailedto
offersufficientproofofaninjurysusceptibletomonetaryvaluation.Bycontrast,in
Hensley,winningandlosingisthefocusofattention.TheCourtsharplydistin-
guishesbetweentimespentonthetwosetsofunrelatedclaims.170 InFarrar,the
objectivefactthattheplaintiffcouldnotconnecttheharm totheoneunspecified
violationfoundbythejuryisthesalientfeature.171 Butinmanyconstitutionaltort
cases,theplaintiffwinsonthemeritswithoutqualificationandobtainsnominal
damagesonlybecausehecannotprovecompensatorydamages.
In order to understand the significance of these differences for the attorneys fee
issue,itisnecessarytobearinmindthatsuccessisacomplexconcept,consisting
ofbothobjectiveandsubjectiveelements.Wecanclarifytheissuesraisedinthe
nominaldamagescasesbyuntanglingthesethemesandexaminingthem oneata
time.Thekeyquestioniswhatkind of success justifies an attorneys fee. On the
objectivedimension,thereareexternalmanifestationsofsuccessand failurein
litigation,asinsportsandcareerandeveryotherendeavor.Inconstitutionallitiga-
tion, there are two distinct objective measures winning on the merits and obtaining
170 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 43435 (1983).
171 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 10607.
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damages.172Ourplaintiffshavemetoneofthese.Successandfailurearealsosub-
jectiveexperiencesthatcannotnecessarilybediscernedbyajudgeoranyother
outsideobserver.Therichmanwhoseeshimselfasafailureisacommontheme,as
is the poor man who takes to heart the admonition that the best things in life are
free. Though courts seem to consider the subjective side of success in attorneys
feelitigation,therearereasonstodoubtwhetheritprovidesaworkablestandard.
i.TwoObjectiveMeasuresofSuccess
ThefirstdifferencebetweenHensley/Farrar andthenominaldamagescasesis
thattheobjectivemeasureofsuccesssendsmixedsignalsinnominaldamagecases.
Thecommonlaw analoguetocaseslikeGray isnotproductsliabilitybutdignitary
tortlitigation,suchasoffensivebattery,falseimprisonment,orinvasionofpri-
vacy.173 Asinthosedignitarytortcases,victoryonthemeritsmaynotproducea
significantmonetaryaward.Ontheonehand,theplaintiffhaswonacompletevictory
onthemerits.Ontheother,hehasnotprovenanycompensatorydamages.Seenin
thislight,Gray seemstoholdthatsuccessisdistinctfrom victoryonthemeritsand
iswhollyamatterofmonetaryrecovery.174Butthisholdingentailsavaluejudgment
astowhatsuccessshouldmean,ajudgmentthatthecourtdoesnotdefendoreven
acknowledge.NorcanthatvaluejudgmentfairlybeattributedtotheSupremeCourt,
asneitherHensley norFarrar involvedafactpatternlikethatofGray.175
A judgmentthatmoneymattersmorethanvictoryonthemeritsseemstoreflecta
lackofrealism withrespecttotheconstitutionaltortcontext.Foronething,thevic-
toriousconstitutionaltortplaintiffhasovercomeaspecialsetofhurdles.Theseobsta-
cles include official immunity, which precludes suits against some officers and
allowsrecoveryagainstothersonlyonashowingthattheynotonlycommittedcon-
stitutional violations but violated clearly established rights.176Anotherobstacleisthe
Courts ruling in Monell v. Department of Social Services,177precludingmunicipal
liabilitybasedonrespondeatsuperiorinconstitutionaltorts.178Asaresult,theplaintiff
mustnavigateacomplexbodyofdoctrinemerelyinordertoestablishliability.
Eventhen,victoriousplaintiffsencounterasystematicproblem thatdirectlyaffects
theamountoftheaward.TheCourthas,initscasesondamages,barredplaintiffs
172 See Dobbs,supra note65,at843(distinguishingbetweenthesetwomeasuresofsuccess).
173 See Careyv.Piphus,435U.S.247,266(1978)(drawingthisanalogy).Cf. JasonNE
Varuhas,The Concept of Vindication in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and Damages,
34OXFORD J.LEGAL STUD.253(2014)(discussingvindicationinEnglishtortlaw).
174 Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887,893(11thCir.2013).
175 Compare Gray,720F.3d887(involvingaminorstudentdetainedandhandcuffedat
school),with Hensley,461U.S.424(involvingdangerouspatientinvoluntarilyconfinedin
hospitals),and Farrar,506U.S.103(involvingtheclosureofaschool).
176 See Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 100304 (7th Cir. 2014).
177 436U.S.658(1977).
178 Id. at691.
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from recovering for the value or importance of constitutional rights.179Underthe
Courts decisions, damages in § 1983 actions are calculated using principles borrowed
from ordinarytortlaw.InCarey v. Piphus,180 the Court said that § 1983 creates a
species of tort liability.181 Damages are governed by the principle of compensa-
tion,182 under which the plaintiff must prove that he suffered a compensable in-
jury.183 Piphus,ajuniorhighschoolstudentwhowassuspendedwithoutbeing
affordedahearing,wassaidtohavebeendeniedproceduraldueprocess.184Buthe
wasnotentitledtorecovercompensatorydamagesifhissuspensionwasultimately
justified,unlesshecouldproveemotionaldistressasaconsequenceoftheproce-
duralviolation.185 The Court expressly rejected Piphuss argument that damages
should be presumed when the plaintiff is denied procedural due process.186
Carey involvedaproceduraldueprocessviolation,anditsholdingmighthave
beenconfinedtoproceduralrights.Severalyearslater,theCourtrejectedanysuch
limit.InMemphis Community School District v. Stachura,187 theplaintiffwasa
schoolteacherwhohadbeensuspendedwithpayinviolationofhissubstantiveFirst
Amendmentrights.188Instructedbythetrialjudgethatitcouldbasedamagesonthe
inherentvalueoffreespeech,189 thejuryawarded $275,000 compensatoryand
$46,000punitivedamages.190 TheCourtruledthattheinstructionwasimproper,
reiteratingtheprincipleithadannouncedinCarey: damage awards must always
be designed tocompensate injuries caused by the [constitutional] deprivation. That
conclusionsimplyleavesnoroom fornoncompensatorydamagesmeasuredbythe
jurys perception of the abstract importance of a constitutional right.191
Sincemanyconstitutionalrightshavenoeasilydiscerniblemonetaryvalue,the
Carey/Stachura ruleensuresthatmanyplaintiffswillgenerallyrecoversubstantial
damagesonlybyprovingconsequentialharm from theviolation.Forthisreason
179 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 30910 (1986).
180 435U.S.247(1978).
181 Id. at253.
182 Id. at257.
183 Id. at255.
184 Id. at250.
185 Id. at263.See, e.g.,Hardenv.Pataki,320F.3d1289,1300(11thCir.2003)(applying
Carey);Alstonv.King,157F.3d1113,1118(7thCir.1998)(applyingCarey).
186 Carey,435U.S.at264.
187 477U.S.299(1986).
188 Id. at 30003.
189 The gist of the instruction is captured in the following two sentences: However, just be-
causetheserightsarenotcapableofpreciseevaluationdoesnotmeanthatanappropriate
monetary amount should not be awarded. The precise value you place upon any Constitutional
right which you find was denied to Plaintiff is within your discretion . . . . Id. at 30203.
190 Thejudgeorderedaremittitur,reducingthecompensatoryawardto$266,750andthe
punitiveawardto$36,000.Id. at303.
191 Id. at 30910 (quoting Carey,435U.S.at265)(alterationinoriginal)(citationsomitted).
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alone, some constitutional claims wil receive more favorable treatment than others
forreasonsthathavenothingtodowiththemerits.Theteacherwhoisfiredor
suspendedwithoutpaycanobtainsignificantdamages,butitislesslikelythatsome-
one in Stachuras situation can do so. The constitutional rights of business enterprises,
whichwilltypicallyinvolveeconomicinterests,willreceivesystematicallyhigher
protectionthanthoseofotherplaintiffs.192Twoplaintiffs,bothofwhom arebeaten
bythepolicewithoutjustification,caneachmakeaFourthAmendmentclaim,but
onlytheonewhosebeatingresultsininjuriesrequiringsignificantmedicaltreatment
mayobtainespeciallylargedamages.Others,likethehandcuffednine-year-oldgirl
inGray,whoincurnophysicalinjuriesorout-of-pocketexpenses,areunlikelyto
obtain much more than nominal damages. Some rights, such as the taxpayers First
Amendmentrighttoblockthe States supportofreligioneventhoughsuccesswill
notaffecthistaxbill,193 or a high school students right to express his opinions by
thewordsonaT-shirt,194ortherightnottobediscriminatedagainstonthebasisof
raceintheconductoflocalelections,195simplydonothaveaneconomicdimension.
Thus,thereisasignificantdifferencebetweencaseslikeFarrar,inwhichtheproblem
is the plaintiffs inability to show a causal connection between the violation and
harmsthathavearecognizedmonetaryvalue,196 andcaseslikeGray,inwhichthe
plaintiffs problem is the difficulty of placing a monetary value on the constitutional
injury.197 IncaseslikeGray,thelackofdamagesdoesnotcorrespondtolackof
success, and the victory is not technical, as it was in Farrar.
Quiteapartfrom thedamagesrules,anotherfeatureoftheconstitutionaltort
contexthasabearingonsuccess.Manyconstitutionaltortsariseoutofconflicts
192 See, e.g.,Fla.Transp.Servs.v.Miami-DadeCty.,703F.3d1230(11thCir.2012)
(upholding jury award of $3.55 million for Commerce Clause violations involving citys
applicationofstevedorepermittingordinance);TriCty.Indus.v.DistrictofColumbia,200
F.3d836(D.C.Cir.2000)(awardinglostprofits);SamaritanInnsv.DistrictofColumbia,
114F.3d1227(D.C.Cir.1997)(awardingpunitivedamagesandotherbusinesslosses).Such
economiclosswaspreciselythetypeofinjuryforwhichFarrarsoughtredress.Farrarv.
Hobby,506U.S.103,106(1992).Farrardidnotprove,however,thathiseconomiclosswas
caused by the defendants violation of an unspecified civil right. Id.
193 See Pelphrey v.Cobb Cty.,547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.2008)(awarding nominal
damagesinanEstablishmentClausecase).
194 Zamecnikv.IndianPrairieSch.Dist.No.204,636F.3d874,881(7thCir.2011)
(approving an award of $25 in damages to a plaintiff whose desire to wear the T-shirt on
multiple occasions in 2007 was thwarted by fear of punishment); see also Corderv.Lewis
Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 122425 (10th Cir. 2009) (considering nominal damages
when students diploma was withheld in violation of free speech rights); Lowry v. Watson
ChapelSch.Dist.,540F.3d752(8thCir.2008)(awardingnominaldamagestostudentswho
weredisciplinedforwearingblackarmbandsinviolationofschoolpolicy).
195 Taylorv.Howe,280F.3d1210(8thCir.2002)(approvingawardsofbetween$500
and$2,000incompensatorydamagestoeachofsevenplaintiffswhoestablishedracial
discriminationagainstthem withrespecttotheirrighttovote).
196 Farrar,506U.S.103.
197 Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887(11thCir.2013).
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betweentheplaintiffandsomegovernmentofficial,suchasapoliceofficerora
jailor.Theplaintiffsinthesecaseswilloftenbeunsympatheticorunpopular.Forthat
reasonalone,damageawardsmaybesystematicallylowerthanforordinarytorts.198
Takentogether,thecombinedeffectofthedamagesrulesandlackofsympathyfor
someplaintiffsisthatformany constitutionaltortplaintiffs,smallornominal
damagesarethemostrealisticoutcome.Thatfactshouldbetakenintoaccountin
measuring the plaintiffs success for purposes of atorneys fees. Indeed, the Court
has already recognized the importance of context in evaluating the plaintiffs success.
InPerdue v. Kenny A.,199theissuewaswhetherafeeshouldbeincreased toreflectthe
plaintiffs exceptional success.200TheCourtruledthatthisshouldgeneralybeavoided
because exceptional results may be due to such contextual features as an unexpect-
edly sympathetic jury, or simple luck.201 ThereisatensionbetweenFarrar and
198 Whetherthisissoinaparticularcaseishardtodeterminefrom readingappellate
opinions,yetthedispositionsofsomecasesaresuggestiveofalackofsympathyforcertain
typesofplaintiffs.See, e.g.,Guzmanv.CityofChicago,689F.3d740,748(7thCir.2012)
(urgingcautioningivinganominaldamagesinstructioninanunlawfulsearchcasebecause
an unlawful search or seizure will often produce, at a minimum, a compensable claim for
loss of time, and, by implication, a nominal damages instruction may improperly influence
a jury to award no compensatory damages); Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 63738
(7th Cir. 2008) (reversing, for lack of evidence, district courts award of $2,100 for
humiliation, emotional distress, and loss of First Amendment rights to a plaintiff who had
beenarrestedforprotectedspeech);Corpusv.Bennett,430F.3d912,917(8thCir.2005)
(affirming the district judges reduction of nominal damages to $1 from the jurys award of
$75,000foranarresteewhowonanexcessiveforceclaim);Parkv.Shiflett,250F.3d843
(4thCir.2001)(affirminganawardofnominaldamagesforaplaintiffwhowasthrown
againstawall,whoselegswerekickedapart,andwhowashandcuffed,allinviolationofhis
FourthAmendmentrights);Slickerv.Jackson,215F.3d1225(11thCir.2000)(reversinga
district courts judgment as a matter of law for the defendant police officers in an excessive
forcecase,whichthedistrictjudgehadissueddespiteevidencethatthepoliceofficershad
brutalizedtheplaintiff);Kylev.Patterson,196F.3d695,697(7thCir.1999)(holdingthat
damageswerenon-existentwhenplaintiffwasheldwithoutaprobablecausehearingfor
sixty-onehours,eventhoughthedueprocesslimitisforty-eighthours);Amatov.Cityof
Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) (In certain circumstances, a jury could
reasonablydeterminethatcompensatorydamagesareinappropriateevenwhereexcessive
force was used, [including] . . . where the injuries lack monetary value. (citation omitted));
Robinsonv.CattaraugusCty.,147 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the jurys denial
of compensatory damages for a Fourth Amendment violation, and stating that the fact that
the jury credited plaintiffs accounts of the officers invasion of Robinsons home in January
1989 did not require it to believe plaintiffs evidence as to either the fact or the extent of their
emotional suffering); Norwood v. Bain, 143 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding an award
ofonlynominaldamagestomotorcyclistsatacharitymotorcyclerallywhowerestopped
andsearchedinviolationoftheirFourthAmendmentrights,eventhoughtheytestifiedthat
theysufferedemotionaldistress).
199 559U.S.542(2010).
200 Id. at546.
201 Id. at554.
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Kenny A. If simple luck or a sympathetic jury are grounds for discounting a plaintiffs
exceptionalsuccess,thenfeaturesofthecontextthathinderrecoveryshouldalso
count,asgroundsforexcusinghisfailuretodobetter,whentheawardissmall.
ii.TheDifficultyofMeasuringSubjectiveSuccess
Ineverydaylife,success,orthelackofit,isasmuchasubjectiveexperienceas
an objective fact. The quest for success always begins with a target,202 andone
persons aim will often differ from anothers.203 Thesameistrueoftortlitigation
generallyandconstitutionaltortlitigationinparticular.Mosttortlitigationinvolves
effortstoobtainlargedamagesforphysicalandemotionalinjuries,but,forcentu-
ries,commonlaw courtshaverecognizedthataplaintiffsuingfordignitarytorts
maygenuinelyaim forvindicationofhisrightsratherthanalargeaward,evenifan
awardwouldalsobewelcome.204TheCourtexplicitlyrecognizedtheapplicationof
thisprincipletoconstitutionaltortsinCarey v. Piphus.205 Conversely,aplaintiff
whoasksforagreatdealandobtainsanamountthatseemsimpressivetoanoutside
observermayactuallybedisappointedwiththeoutcome.
Whether courts should take plaintiffs subjective attitudes into account in de-
termining attorneys fees is a different matter. The basic problem is that, in order for
courts to consider this factor, they must have a means for determining the plaintiffs
stateofmind.Inpracticeitishardtoknow whatmotivatestheplaintiff.Evenifhe
knowshecannotprovealargemonetarylosstheplaintiff(orhislawyer)maypursue
thelitigationbecausehebelievesthatalargeawardcanbeobtainedunderthe
headingofemotionaldistress.Buthemay(also)investhistime,energy,money,and
emotionalresourcessimplyforthesakeofvindicatinghisrightsortryingtoestab-
lishalegalprinciplethatwillinfluenceofficialactionsinthefuture.Manyfact
202 TOM MORRIS,TRUESUCCESS:A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF EXCELLENCE35(1994).
203 In one study, for example, social class significantly affected childrens ambitions. See
F.M.Katz,The Meaning of Success: Some Differences in Value Systems of Social Classes,
62J.SOC.PSYCHOL.141,147(1964)(findingthatchildrenwhosefathersarewhitecollar
professionalsaremorelikelytoview successastheachievementofacertainstatus,while
childrenwhosefathersworkinunskilledmanuallabormoreoftendefinesuccessinterms
ofearningpossessions).
204 CHARLES T.MCCORMICK,HANDBOOK ON THELAW OF DAMAGES §§ 2022 (1935);see
also 1THEODORESEDGWICK,A TREATISEON THEMEASUREOF DAMAGES §99(9thed.1912).
205 435 U.S. 247, 26667 (1978) (Common-law courts traditionally have vindicated
deprivations of certain absolute rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury
throughtheawardofanominalsum ofmoney.Bymakingthedeprivationofsuchrights
actionablefornominaldamageswithoutproofofactualinjury,thelawrecognizestheimportance
toorganizedsocietythatthoserightsbescrupulouslyobserved....Becausetherighttopro-
cedural due process is absolute . . . and because of the importance to organized society that
proceduraldueprocessbeobserved,webelievethatthedenialofproceduraldueprocessshould
be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury. (footnotes omitted) (cita-
tionsomitted)).
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patterns,especiallyonesthatinvolveunpleasantencounterswiththepolice,suggest
thatmoneymaynotbeaprimarygoal.206Succeedingonthemeritsbutobtainingno
damagescountsassuccessforsuchaplaintiff,regardlessofwhethertheexternal
observerconcernedonlywithmoneywouldperceiveitassuch.Ontheotherhand,
theseplaintiffsmayreallybeinterestedinmoneyandcanfairlybesaidtohave
failediftheydonotgetit.Yet,itisimpossibletoknow whethertheyperceivethe
outcome as a success or not. A further question is whether the plaintiffs attitude
towardthelitigationshouldbemeasuredattheoutsetorattheend.Someonewho
setoutwiththeaim ofobtainingalargeawardmayultimatelybehappywithalargely
symbolicvictory.
Despitethesedifficulties,somecourtsputconsiderableemphasisonthesubjec-
tiveinquiry.Theydodgetheproblemsbylookingatwhatplaintiffsaskedforand
comparingthatfiguretowhattheyobtained.207Theirreasoningevidentlyisthatthe
amount asked for is objective evidence of the plaintiffs subjective motivation.
Farrars emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff asked for $17 millionandreceived
onlynominaldamagesseemstosupportthisapproach.208Inourview,itisamistake
torelyonFarrar forinquiry into a plaintiffs subjectiveattitude,becauseFarrar is
betterunderstoodasacaseinwhichtheobjective manifestationsofsuccesswere
absent.Theplaintifffailedtoproveacausallinkbetweenthewrongandtheharm
forwhich hesoughtredress.Taken together,theobjectivefactsoftheFarrar
litigationcertainlysupportaninferencethattheplaintifffellfarshortofwhathe
subjectivelysoughtand,therefore,failed.209 But the Courts ability to draw that in-
ferenceinFarrar doesnotsupportthepropositionthatwecandosowithconfi-
denceinothercases.Forexample,itwouldnotbeatallsurprisingtofindthatthe
nine-year-oldgirlandherparentsinGray weresubjectivelysatisfiedwithaformal
judicialdeclarationthattheconstitutionclearlyprohibitsthehandcuffingofachild
206 See, e.g., Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept, 756 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014)
(policeofficersenteredhomeundertheincorrectbeliefthataburglarywasinprogress,shotthe
familydog,andheldaguntotheheadofanunarmedboy);Greenv.CityofSanFrancisco,751
F.3d1039(9thCir.2014)(officerarrestedplaintiffaftermistakenlyidentifyingplaintiffs
carasastolenvehicle);Huffv.Reichert,744F.3d999(7thCir.2014)(policestopped
plaintiffs car in a high-crime area and conducted pat-down search without probable cause).
207 See, e.g.,Grayex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 720 F.3d 887, 895 (11th Cir. 2013) (Like
theplaintiffsinFarrar,Grayachievedverylimitedsuccessinthiscase;sheaskedforalarge
amountofmoneyandreceivedanominalaward.True,shedidnotseek$17million.Butthe
differenceremainssubstantialbetweenthe$25,000thatshesoughtandthenominalaward
she received.) Other cases, mostly brought under TitleVII,inwhichcourtsbasefeesona
comparisonoftheamountofmoneysoughtandtheamountawarded,arediscussedin
Rosenthal,supra note 24, at 8283. Professor Rosenthal concludes that the less money the
plaintiffrequests,themorelikelyheistorecover attorneys fees if he is awarded only nomi-
nal damages. Id. at82.
208 Farrarv.Hobby,506U.S.103,114(1992).
209 Id.
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at school without probable cause, even if they were also disappointed by the jurys
nominaldamageaward.
WiththeexceptionofFarrar,thesubjectiveinquiryismisguidedforseveral
reasons.First,itisinherentlyandnearlyalwaysunreliablebecausefew courtscan
ever obtain trustworthy information on the plaintiffs subjective attitudes. Second,
theefforttocounterthatdifficultybycomparingtheamountsoughtwiththeamount
awardeddisregardsthepossibilitythatplaintiffsaremotivatedbybothmoneyand
victoryonthemeritsorthatmotivationschangeovertime.Themeritsmaycount
for far more in the plaintiffs mind, even if he seeks a big award. Third, plaintiffs
wiltypicallyrelyontheirlawyersforadviceonconductingthelitigation.Asaresult,
the comparative approach creates a conflict of interest for the plaintiffs lawyer, as
the clients interest might be better served by asking for more while the lawyer could
ensure success (and, hence, a fee award) by asking for less. Fourth, the compara-
tiveapproachisalsoatoddswiththedeterrenceandvindication goalsofboth
constitutionaltortlaw andthefeestatute.Totheextentaskingforlesswouldsys-
tematicalyproducelowerawards,bothofthesegoalswilbecompromised.Itseems
perversetoencourageplaintiffstolitigateinawaythatunderminestheultimate
goals of the civil rights and attorneys fees statutes. For all of these reasons, it is
better to forego basing attorneys fee awards on judicial inquiry into the plaintiffs
subjectivemotivationsandattitudes.
b. Do Low Awards Further Vindication and Deterrence?
Whethertheplaintiffshouldgetafeeinanominaldamagescasedependson
whetherhehasachievedenough successatfurtheringthevindicationanddeterrence
goalsof§1983,giventhedistinctivefeaturesofconstitutionaltortlitigation,includ-
ing the immunity, official policy, and (especially) damages calculation hurdles
plaintiffsface.Thereareargumentsonbothsidesoftheissueofwhetherlow awards
sufficientlyadvancethedeterrenceandvindicationgoals.Becausethereisnoun-
answerableargumentonewayortheotheroneithergoal,valuejudgmentsareunavoid-
able. In our view, the balance of competing considerations favors attorneys fees on
bothgrounds.
i.Deterrence
Thetraditionaldeterrencerationaleforconstitutionaltortlaw isthatimposinglia-
bilityfordamagesonmunicipalitiesandofficialswhoviolateconstitutionalrightswil
discouragethem from committingfutureviolations.210 Thisrationaleischallenged
210 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (The purpose of §1983 is to deter
stateactorsfrom usingthebadgeoftheirauthoritytodepriveindividualsoftheirfederally
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.); City of Riverside
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byseveralscholarswhoofferavarietyofreasonswhydamageawardsincivilrights
caseswillnoteffectivelydeterfutureconstitutionalviolations.211Onecomplicating
factoristhewidespreadpracticeofindemnification.Onestudyreportedthatindivid-
ualenforcementofficialsinthirty-sevensmallandmid-sizedjurisdictionsnever
contributedtoasettlementorjudgmentinacivilrightssuitbroughtagainstthem.212
Factorsotherthanthesizeofadamageaward,however,mightcontributetodeter-
rence.Forexample,anotherstudyreportedthatdefendantsincivilrightscasesavoid
makingRule68offersofjudgmentbecauseoftheadverseimpactthatajudgment
wouldhaveontheirpersonallivesandcareer.213
Therearereasonstobelievethatawardsofnominaldamagescanadvancethe
goalofdeterrence.First,asalludedtoabove,factorsotherthanmonetaryliability
mayinfluencebehavior.Anofficeradjudgedtohaveinflictedexcessiveforcemay
nolongerbeeligibleforselectiontoaSWAT team,evenifonlynominaldamages
wereawarded.214Second,thefactthatagivenconstitutionalviolationproducedonly
nominaldamagesin onecasedoesnotmean thatsubstantialdamageswillbe
precludedinthenextcase.Forexample,althoughthenine-year-oldplaintiffinGray
didnotsufferaninjuryofmonetaryvalue,215 thenextchildplacedinhandcuffs
v.Rivera,477U.S.561,575(1986) ([T]he damages a plaintiff recovers contributes sig-
nificantlytothedeterrenceofcivilrightsviolationsinthefuture[,]...particularly...inthe
area of individual police misconduct . . . .); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
65152 (1980) (Moreover, § 1983 was intended . . . to serve as a deterrent against future
constitutionaldeprivations....Theknowledgethatamunicipalitywillbeliableforallof
itsinjuriousconduct,whethercommittedingoodfaithornot,shouldcreateanincentivefor
officialswhomayharbordoubtsaboutthelawfulnessoftheirintendedactionstoerronthe
side of protecting citizens constitutional rights.). Also, note that the potential of over-
deterrenceistherationaleusedtojustifythevariousimmunitydoctrines.See, e.g.,Harlow
v.Fitzgerald,457U.S.800,814(1982)(quotingGregoirev.Biddle,177F.2d579,581(2d
Cir.1949)).
211 Forasummaryofthisargumentandcitationstoauthorities,seeJoannaC.Schwartz,
Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decision-
making,57UCLA L.REV.1023,1025(2010).
212 JoannaC.Schwartz,Police Indemnification,89N.Y.U.L.REV.885,890(2014).Pro-
fessorSchwartzalsoreportsthatlitigationandbudgetingpracticesofstateandlocalgovernments
tendtolessenthefinancialimpactofsettlementsandjudgmentsonlawenforcementagencies.
JoannaC.Schwartz,How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform,63
UCLA L.REV.(forthcoming 2016),http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2635673.
213 HaroldS.Lewis,Jr.& ThomasA.Eaton,Rule 68 Offers of Judgment: The Practices
and Opinions of Experienced Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Attorneys,241
F.R.D. 332, 350 (2007) ([W]e were told by several civil rights defense lawyers that a police
officerwhohasajudgmententeredagainsthim individuallywouldhavemoredifficulty
securingamortgageandfacedifficultiesincareeradvancement,suchasbecomingamember
of a SWAT team.).
214 Id.
215 Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887,899(11thCir.2013).
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withoutprobablecausemaysuffersignificantcompensableemotionaldistress.216Thus,
governmentalemployerswhoindemnifyindividualofficialswhoviolatetheconsti-
tutionalrightsofotherswillhaveaneconomicincentivetoavoidfutureviolations.
Third,andperhapsmostimportant,anymodelofdeterrenceassumesthatthe
partywhosebehaviorissoughttobeinfluencedhasreasonablyaccurateinformation
regardingtheriskofviolations.Encouraginglitigationthatuncoversconstitutional
violationseventhoughproducingonlynominaldamagesisnecessarytoprovidea
moreaccurateassessmentoftheriskoffutureviolations.217Nominaldamagescases
canprovideusefulinformationtogovernmentsandsupervisoryofficials.Litigation
thatresultsinnominaldamagesmayhelpidentifyofficerswhoareespeciallyprone
tocommitconstitutionalviolationsorsituationsthatarelikelytogiverisetothem.
Prospectiveplaintiffsinlaterlitigationmayalsobenefitfrom thatinformation.
Fourth, the rule on attorneys fees will have consequences for whether constitu-
tionaltortclaimswithuncertaindamageswillbelitigatedatall.218 Theintangible
natureofconstitutionalrightsandtheCarey/Stachura damagesrulesmakeitim-
possibletopredicthow ajurywillassessdamagesinanygivenconstitutionaltort
case.Theproblem isnotuniquetoconstitutionaltorts.Awardsfornonpecuniary
lossvarysignificantlyfrom casetocaseinordinarytortlaw aswell.219Similarly,it
isoftenimpossibletopredictwhetherandhow muchajurywillawardinpunitive
216 Ifthesecondvictim isespeciallysensitive,theemotionaldistressofbeinghandcuffed
infrontoffellowstudentsmightbesevere.Cf. ComplaintforDamagesandDeclaratoryand
Injunctive Relief and Jury Demand, S.R. v. Kenton Cty. Sheriffs Office, 2015WL 9462973
(E.D.Kyl,Dec.28,2015)(No.2:15-cv-143),2015WL 4606272.Thissuitinvolvedthe
handcuffingofaneight-year-oldboyandanine-year-oldgirlinaKentuckyschool.Theboy
wasallegedtohavesufferedfrom post-traumaticstressdisorder(PTSD)andattentiondeficit
hyperactivedisorder(ADHD).ThegirlwasalsoallegedtohaveADHD.See SherylGay
Stolberg,A.C.L.U. Sues Over Handcuffing of Boy, 8, and Girl, 9, in Kentucky School,N.Y.
TIMES (Aug.3,2015),http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/us/aclu-sues-over-handcuffing
-of-boy-8-and-girl-9-in-kentucky-school.html. The common law thin skull or egg shell
skull doctrine applies to constitutional torts. The constitutional tort defendant, like his common
law counterpart, takes his victim as he finds him and is fully liable for the resulting
damageeventhoughtheinjuredplaintiffhadapreexistingconditionthatmadetheconse-
quences of the wrongful act more severe than they would have been for a normal victim.
Figueroa-Torres v. Toledo-Davila, 232 F.3d 270, 27576 (1st Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
217 Theimportanceofcivilrightslawsuitsininformingpolicymakersofriskismorefully
developedinSchwartz,supra note 211, at 102829.
218 See JulieDavies,Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990s: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory,48HASTINGS L.J.197,237(1997)(surveyingthirty-fivepractitioners
and finding that [s]everal attorneys commented that they must make difficult strategic
decisionsaboutwhatclaimstopursuegiventhecombinationofjurorreluctancetoaward
highdamagesforconstitutionalviolationsandthepossibilitythatjudgeswilluseFarrar to
justify a denial of fees).
219 See RonenAvraham,Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change,100NW.U.L.REV.87,91(2006).
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damages,yetlargepunitiveawardscanhaveasignificantdeterrentimpact.Unless
plaintiffs who win on the merits can be assured of obtaining an attorneys fee, law-
yersmaybehesitanttotakethesecasesatall,andthedeterrentimpactofthelitigation
thatdoesresultinalargeawardwouldbelost.
ii.Vindication
Theissuehereiswhetherconstitutionalrightsaresufficientlyvindicatedby
nominal damages to justify an adequate attorneys fee. One argument against a fee
beginswiththefamiliarprincipleofcommonlaw tortsthattheaim ofdamagesis
tomaketheplaintiffwhole.Obligingthedefendanttomakeupforthewrongcor-
rects the injustice done by the tortfeasor and vindicates the plaintiffs rights against
thewrongdoer.Supposetheconstitutionaltortplaintiffclaimsalargelossand
receivesasmallornominalaward.Thereappearstobeagapbetweentheamount
neededtovindicaterightsbymakingtheplaintiffwholeandtheamountawarded.
Iftheconstitutionalrightisnotfullyvindicated,thevindicationgoalisnotfully
realizedandtherationaleforawardingafeeisweakened.Statedinthisway,the
anti-feeargumentgetsnowherebecauseitignoresacorollaryofthecommonlaw
rule:iftheplaintiffwinsonthemeritsbutcanproveonlysmalornodamages,thenhe
isnecessarilymadewholebyasmalornominalaward,andthevindicationaim ismet.
A better way to frame the objection to attorneys fees for vindication in nominal
damagescasesisthattheforceofthevindicationgoalnonethelessdependsonthe
amountofthedamages,sincethedamagesareameasureofthevalueoftherights
vindicated.Lackofcompensatorydamagesshowsthattherightsarenotsufficiently
valuabletojustifyafee.Incommonlaw tortlitigation,theplaintiffcannotwina
negligencecaseonthemeritswithoutestablishingsomedamages;damagesarean
elementofthecauseofaction.220Moreover,claimsthatdonotinvolvelargedam-
agesarerejectedbymanylawyersbecausetheypresentnoopportunitytoobtaina
largecontingentfee.221Theanti-vindicationargumentseemstoapplythisreasoning
tothe§1983context.Justassmalclaimsforordinarytortsarenotlitigatedonaccount
of their slight value, the same should be true for constitutional torts. The Attorneys
FeesAwardsActshouldnotbeappliedinawaythatencourageslawyerstobringthem.
A premiseofthisargumentisthatthedamagesmeasurethevalueoftheright.
Intheconstitutionaltortcontext,thatpremiseisinvalid.222ThepointofStachura is
220 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS §6(AM.LAW INST.2005).
221 Thisissoeveninordinarytortlitigation.Forarecentillustration,seeBarryMeier&
HillaryStout,Victims of G.M. Deadly Defect Fall Through Legal Cracks,N.Y.TIMES
(Dec.29,2014),http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/business/victims-of-gm-deadly-defect
-fall-through-legal-cracks.html (quoting a letter from a plaintiffs law firm to a Wisconsin
family seeking legal representation against General Motors for a childs death possibly caused
by a faulty airbag declining the case [b]ecause of the $350,000 maximum recovery for loss of
society in Wisconsin and the extreme expense of litigating the case against General Motors).
222 Whetherthepremiseisvalidintheothercontexts to which the Attorneys Fees Awards
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thattheplaintiffisnotentitledtoaninstructionauthorizingthejurytoawarddam-
agesforthevalueoftheconstitutionalrightthedefendantviolated.223 Thus,an
argumentthatthelackofanawardisproofofthelackofvalueoftherightseems
unsound.Inaddition,theanalogytothecommonlaw ignoresanimportantcategory
ofcommonlaw torts.Eveninthecommonlaw,therearesometortsforwhich
nominaldamagesareavailablepreciselybecausethelitigationisavaluablemeans
ofenforcingrightsagainstavarietyofintrusionsbywrongdoers,whetherornotany
harm results. In particular, there are dignitary torts, such as battery, assault, inva-
sionofprivacy,falseimprisonment,anddefamation,inwhichliabilityisimposed
in order to vindicate the plaintiffs rights. Unlike negligence law, damages are not
requiredinordertoestablishthatliability,andnominaldamagescanbeawarded
evenifnocompensatorydamagesareproved.224AttheendofitsopinioninCarey,
theCourtrecognizedthatconstitutionaltortsfitintothiscategory.225 Evenifthe
plaintiffcannotprovecompensatorydamages, Piphus would beentitledtorecover
nominal damages not to exceed one dollar . . . .226
The common laws premise in recognizing dignitary torts and awarding nominal
damagesforthem isthattheaimsoftortincludenotonlycompensationforwrong-
fullossbutalsovindicationofrightsindependent ofloss.227 Evenifnominalor
smalldamagesdonotmaketheplaintiffwhole,theycanprovidetheredressneeded
toadequatelyvindicatetheright.228 Thegoalsofconstitutionaltortlaw likewise
Actappliesisaseparatequestionandisnotourconcernhere.See supra note24andac-
companyingtext.
223 MemphisCmty.Sch.Dist.v.Stachura,477U.S.299(1986).
224 See, e.g.,MCCORMICK,supra note204,§22(1935)(notingthatforwrongswhichare
trespasses such as assault and battery the rule remains that proof of the defendants
wrongdoingenablestheplaintifftorecovernominaldamagesthoughnolossordamages
beyondtheinvasionofrightshown);RobertC.Post,The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort,77CALIF.L.REV.957,967(1989) ([F]or
certain types of dignitary torts, the law serves the purpose of vindicating the injured party.
(alterationinoriginal)).
225 Careyv.Piphus,435U.S.247,266(1978).
226 Id. at267.
227 See, e.g.,Aultv.Lohr,538So.2d454,455(Fla.1989)(awardingnominaldamages
in an inmates claim for assault and battery and noting that [n]ominal damages are awarded
tovindicate an invasion of ones legal rights where, although no physical or financial injury
hasbeeninflicted,theunderlyingcauseofactionhasbeenprovedtothesatisfactionofa
jury (emphasis added)); Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Liti-
gation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society,42VAND.L.REV.1,30(1989)(notingthat
plaintiffs can recover nominal damages for dignitary torts as a means of assuaging their
dignity even if they have suffered no physical or emotional injury at all).
228 See, e.g.,Biermanv.Weier,828N.W.2d436,467(Iowa2013)(Wiggins,J.,concur-
ring) ([T]he only way a defamed person can definitely vindicate hisorherreputationisto
bringanactionagainstthedefamer....[A nominal]awardofonedollarvindicates the
defamed persons reputation, a remedy far superior to any dollar amount a jury might
award.(emphasis added)); see generally JohnC.P.Goldberg,Two Conceptions of Tort
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includenotonlycompensation(anddeterrence)butalsovindication.Liketherights
protected by dignitary torts, constitutional rights cannot be valued solely in mone-
tary terms.229 Winningonthemeritsandobtainingnominaldamagesissufficient
to achieve the vindication goal and to justify an attorneys fee under the statute.
c. Harmonizing Constitutional Remedies for Past and Future Violations
The Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 does not distinguish between awards
forprospectiveandretrospectiverelief.Yetprevailingplaintiffsinprospectiverelief
cases fare well under the Supreme Courts attorneys fee doctrine, even when the
real-worldimpactoftherelieftheyobtainisminimal.Beforelate2012,theissueof
whether victorious plaintiffs could obtain attorneys fees in such cases was uncer-
tain, and that lack of clarity may have provided some support for the low award,
low fee principle in damages cases. But theSupremeCourtundercutthatsupport
inLefemine v. Wideman.230Inthatcase,anabortionprotestorchallengedhistreat-
mentbythepoliceandsoughtnominaldamagesandaninjunction.231Theinjunction
was granted, but the district court denied attorneys fees and the Fourth Circuit
affirmedonthegroundthattheinjunctiondidnotaltertherelativepositionsofthe
parties because it merely ordered Defendants to comply with the law, and [n]o
other damages were awarded.232 Inaunanimouspercuriam ruling,theSupreme
Courtvacatedthejudgment.233Byremovingthethreatoffuturearrest,theinjunction
worked the requisite material alteration in the parties relationship.234 Even a
preliminaryinjunction,whichdoesnotdefinitivelyresolvethecaseonthemerits,
Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation,55DEPAULL.REV.435, 437 (2006) (arguing that tort
asalaw fortheredressofwrongs...supportsaconceptionoftortdamagesasfair
compensation, which need not make the plaintiff whole).
229 See CityofRiversidev.Rivera,477U.S.561,574(1986)(pluralityopinion);see also
Robinsonv.CityofHarvey,489F.3d864,872(7thCir.2007)(statingthatthegoalofvindi-
cationofconstitutionalrightsisdistinctfrom assessingthemonetarydamagesfrom their
violation).Thispointholdswhethertheawardissmalornominal.Onthedistinctvindicatory
roleofnominaldamages,seeGuzmanv.CityofChicago,689F.3d740,748(7thCir.2012)
(nominal damages . . . are an appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation has
not caused actual, provable injury); Schneider v. County of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784, 795
(9th Cir. 2002) (Compensatory damages and nominal damages serve distinct purposes.
Nominal damages are a purely symbolic vindication of [a] constitutional right, and are
awarded regardless of whether the constitutional violation causes any actual damage.
Compensatorydamages,bycontrast,servetoreturntheplaintifftothepositionheorshe
would have occupied had the harm not occurred. (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
230 133S.Ct.9(2012).
231 Id. at10.
232 Id. at11(firstalterationinoriginal).
233 Id. at12.
234 Id. at11.See also Sanchezv.CityofAustin,774F.3d873(5thCir.2014)(holdingthat
a district court abused its discretion in denying attorneys fees to plaintiffs who secured injunctive
relief against the citys enforcement of criminal trespass laws against political protestors).
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canbesufficient,235 unless the preliminary relief is undone by the final decision in
the same case.236Thisdoctrinecanbetracedbacktothecaselaw onwhich§1988
wasmodeled.InNewman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,237theCourtapprovedan
award of attorneys fees to a plaintiff who secured injunctive relief against a defen-
dantwhohadviolatedTitleII ofthe1964CivilRightsAct,eventhoughthestatute
didnotauthorizeanawardofdamages.238Theframersof§1988citedNewman as
the guiding authority for awarding attorneys fees under § 1988.239
ItisfairtocriticizeGray,decidedinAugust2013,fornothavingtakenaccount
ofLefemine,decidedinNovember2012.Thatsaid,therewas,infact,somepre-
Lefemine lowercourtauthorityforthepropositionthatinsufficientlysignificant
injunctivereliefwouldnotmeritafee.InPeople Helpers Foundation v. City of
Richmond,240forexample,thecourtdeniedfeestoanon-profitcorporationthathad
obtainedaninjunctionprohibitingthecityfrom harassingit,reasoningthattherelief
wasde minimis sinceitonlyrequiredthecitytoobeythelaw.241ButLefemine repu-
diatesthatlineofcases.Itundermines the low award, low fee rulings byrejecting,
inthecontextofprospectiverelief,thenotionthatcourtsshouldevaluatetheim-
portance of a given plaintiffs victory in deciding whether to award a fee.242 That
notioncansurviveintheretrospectivereliefcontextonlyiftherearegoodgrounds
fordistinguishingbetweenbackward-lookingandforward-lookingremedies.
The principle underlying the attorneys fee doctrine in prospective relief cases
isthattheplaintiffachievessuccess,andisentitledtoafee,whenhevindicateshis
rights.Besidesfailingtoimplementthevindicationanddeterrencegoalsofconstitu-
tional tort law, the atorneys fee rule adopted in Gray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson
draws an arbitrary distinction between the attorneys fee doctrine on prospective and
retrospectiverelief.Therearedifferencesbetweenthetworemedies,butthosedif-
ferencesrelatetothevariouscontextsinwhichconstitutionalviolationstakeplace
andhavenobearingonwhetherafeeshouldbeawardedtoaprevailingplaintiff.
Some constitutional violations the ones that give rise to suits for damages occur
moreorlessunexpectedly,oradhoc,inthecourseofrandom encounterswiththe
policethatresultinFourthAmendmentviolations,243 or by officials decisions that
violate their subordinates First Amendment rights,244 or prison guards deliberate
235 See, e.g.,HigherTaste,Inc.v.CityofTacoma,717F.3d712,716(9thCir.2013);Com-
mon Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 135556 (11thCir.2009);PeopleAgainstPolice
Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 22829 (3d Cir. 2008).
236 Solev.Wyner,551U.S.74,83(2007).
237 390U.S.400(1968).
238 Id. at400.
239 See S.REP.NO. 94-1011, at 23 (1976).
240 12F.3d1321(4thCir.1993).
241 Id. at 132829.
242 See LeFeminev.Wideman,133S.Ct.9,11(2012).
243 See, e.g.,Deorlev.Rutherford,272F.3d1272(9thCir.2001).
244 See, e.g.,Lanev.Franks,134S.Ct.2369(2014).
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indifferenceinresponsetospecificthreatstothehealthandsafetyofinmatesin
violationoftheEighthAmendment.245Otherviolationsaremorepredictablebecause
theyareeitherongoingorthreatenedinthefuture,suchasprisonconditionsthatfall
shortofEighth Amendmentrequirements,246 orordinancesthatunduly restrict
speechbyregulatingsignsonthebasisoftheircontent,247 orsystematicpolice
practicesthatpresentanongoingthreatofviolations,248suchasapolicyofstopping
driversofagivenethnicity.249Plaintiffschargingthelattercategoryofviolationscan
seekprospectivereliefintheform ofaninjunctionthatwilorderofficialstostopthe
challengedpracticeorelsebeheldincontemptandfinedorjailed.Alternatively,
theymayseekadeclaratoryjudgment,whichwillgenerallyhavethesameeffect
withouttheimmediatethreatofcontempt.250 Intheformercategory,plaintiffsare
barredfrom prospectivereliefbecausetheycannotshow anongoingthreatthattheir
rightswillbeviolated.251Theonlyavailableremedymaybeasuitfordamagesfor
thepastviolation.Thetworemediesarenotmutuallyexclusive.Theyaremutually
re-enforcing.Bothaim atvindicationanddeterrence.Whentheviolationisongoing,
theplaintiffmayseekbothprospectiveandretrospectiverelief.
Therearedifferencesbetweenprospectiveandretrospectivelitigation,butthe
differencesrelatetotheobstaclesplaintiffsfaceontheirwaytovictoryonthemerits
andhavenobearingonthelevelofsuccessaprevailingplaintiffmustachievein
order to obtain a fee. Thus, the plaintiff cannot get an attorneys fee unless he ob-
tains a judicial ruling in his favor and not a mere change in defendants behavior.252
Anotherproblem forplaintiffsseekingprospectivereliefisestablishingtheirstanding
to sue. In order to do so, they must show that the defendants violation has caused
injury in fact to themselves and that the injury will be redressed by the available
relief.253ButtheCarey/Stachura testdoesnotapply.Thereisnoneedtoshow either
economicharm orcompensatorydamages.254Theinjuryinfactrequirementismet
245 See, e.g.,Farmerv.Brennan,511U.S.825(1994).
246 See, e.g.,Brownv.Plata,131S.Ct.1910(2011).
247 See, e.g.,Reedv.TownofGilbert,135S.Ct.2218(2015).
248 See, e.g.,EasyridersFreedom F.I.G.H.T.v.Hannigan,92F.3d1486(9thCir.1996).
249 See, e.g.,Melendresv.Arpaio,695F.3d990(9thCir.2012).
250 See SamuelL.Bray,The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment,63DUKEL.J.1091,
1094(2014).
251 See, e.g.,CityofLosAngelesv.Lyons,461U.S.95,105(1983).Plaintiffswhocan
establishneitherapastviolationnorathreatoffutureviolation,butsimplyobjecttoalaw
theybelievetobeunconstitutional,donotsatisfytherequirementsforeithertypeofrelief.
See, e.g.,CMR D.N.Corp.v.CityofPhiladelphia,703F.3d612(3dCir.2013).
252 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S.598,619(2001).
253 See Hollingsworthv.Perry,133S.Ct.2652,2663(2013);Lujanv.Defs.ofWildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 55967 (1992).
254 The distinction between the two contexts was the core of the courts reasoning in
Acevedo-Luis v. Pagan, 478 F.3d 35, 3839 (1st Cir. 2007). The plaintiff established a free
speechviolationbutwasawardednodamages.Id. at37.Onthedamagesissue,hesought
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by showing, for example, that the defendants actions would diminish their enjoy-
mentoftheenvironment,255 orviolatetheirstatutoryrighttoprivacy,256 orblock
theiraccesstoinformation,257orthreatentheirfutureexerciseoffreespeechrights.258
Whenplaintiffssueforbothprospectiveandretrospectiveremedies,standingtosue
mustbemetseparatelyforeachtypeofrelief.259Beingplacedinachokeholdbya
policeofficerononeoccasionmayentitletheplaintifftodamages,butitdoesnot
warrantprospectiverelief.260 Bycontrast,ahistoryofbeingstoppedbythepolice
fifteentimesinthepastwillsufficetoshow acontinuingthreat.261
Oncethisthresholdismetandtheplaintiffobtainsajudgment,orevenprelimi-
naryreliefinsomecases,hehasmadehiscaseforafee.Insettingstandardsforfee
awardstoplaintiffswhohaveobtainedprospectiverelief,theSupremeCourthas
neverrequiredtheplaintifftomeettheCarey/Stachura testoravariantofitadapted
totheprospectivereliefcontext.Thatis,plaintiffsroutinelyobtainfeeswithout
showingeitherpastorpresentcompensatorydamages.262 Norisitnecessaryto
demonstrateathreatoffuturecompensatorydamages.263Nordoesitmaterthatcom-
pensatorydamagesmaybebarredbyofficialimmunity.264Thekeyissueiswhether
the resolution changed the legal relationship between the parties in the plaintiffs
favor.265Now considerthenominaldamagescontext.UnderGray,Aponte,McAfee,
an instruction that any violation of his First Amendment rights constituted irreparable injury.
Id. at38.Plaintiffcitedthewell-establishedprincipleinthecontextofprospectivereliefthat
[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury. Id. (alterationinoriginal).Thedistrictcourthadrejectedthis
reasoning, noting that while thelanguageaccuratelydescribedoneoftherequirementsfor
apreliminary injunction inaFirstAmendmentcase,itwouldnotbehelpfultoajuryinde-
terminingthecompensatory damages for a First Amendment violation. Id. (citationomitted).
Theappellatecourtaffirmeddenialoftheinstruction,citingCarey,Stachura,andFarrar.
Id. Italsonotedthattheplaintiffhadnotsoughtnominaldamages.Id. at39.
255 See, e.g.,FriendsoftheEarth,Inc.v.LaidlawEnvtl.Servs.,528U.S.167,169(2000).
256 See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 62425 (2004).
257 See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 2025 (1998).
258 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 234041 (2014).
259 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 10105 (1983).
260 See id. at110.
261 See Kolenderv.Lawson,461U.S.352,355n.3(1983).
262 See, e.g.,Sanchezv.CityofAustin,774F.3d873(5thCir.2014)(findinganabuseof
discretion to deny plaintiffs attorneys fees because they did not secure an award of damages
whentheydidsecureinjunctiverelief).
263 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 18588 (2000).
264 See Pulliam v.Allen,466U.S.522,527(1984)(relyingonthelegislativehistoryof
§1988).
265 See Lefeminev.Wideman,133S.Ct.9,11(2012).Thetypeofcaseinwhichplaintiffs
failthistestisillustratedbyRhodes v. Stewart,488U.S.1(1988)(percuriam).Twoprisoners
allegedviolationsoftheirEighthAmendmentrightsandsucceededonthemeritsbutwere
releasedbeforetheycouldbenefitfrom anyrelief.Id. TheCourtheldthattheycouldnot
obtainafee.
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andRichardson,plaintiffswhosueforpastwrongsmustmeetamoredemanding
test.Itisnotenoughthattheyvindicatetheirrights;theymustobtainsignificantcom-
pensatorydamagesaswell.266
Thedistinctionbetweenthestandardsforawardingfeesincaseswherethe
plaintiffseeksinjunctivereliefandcasesinwhichheseeksdamagesisarbitraryand
unjustified.Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwocontextsisthetimingofthecon-
stitutionalviolation.Thedamageclaim concernsaviolationthathasalreadyoc-
curredandtheinjunctioncaseinvolvesathreatenedfutureviolation.Thisdifference
is irrelevant to the goal of § 1988 to encourage lawyers to take cases aimed at de-
terringconstitutionalviolationsandvindicatingconstitutionalrights.
d. Implementing the Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976
Vindicatingrightsandremedyingviolationsareworthyobjectives,butthey
wouldnotcarrymuchweightbythemselvesifthefeestatutewasdesignedtofurther
adifferentsetofpolicies.Howevervaluablethoseendsmaybe,itisuptoCongress
todecidewhether,why,andtowhatextentweshouldcarveoutexceptionstothe
American Rule on attorneys fees. In fact, realizing the vindicatory, deterrent, and
remedial goals of constitutional torts were among Congresss core aims in enacting
§1988.267Asamatterofinterpreting§1988soastoachievecongressionalintent,
thenarrow readingofFarrar, in which its no fee award for nominal damages rule
islimitedtocaseswithsimilarfacts,ispreferabletothebroadanti-feeruleadopted
inGray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson.
Congressrecognizedthatthereisapublicinterestinthevindicationofindividual
constitutionalrights.Thepublic,andnotjusttheindividuallitigant,benefitswhen
constitutionalviolationsarebroughtto light.AsstatedbytheCourtin City of
Riverside v. Rivera:
[A]civilrightsactionfordamages[doesnot]constitute[][merely]
aprivatetortsuitbenefitingonlytheindividualplaintiffswhose
rightswereviolated....[A]civilrightsplaintiffseekstovindi-
cateimportantcivilandconstitutionalrightsthatcannotbevalued
solelyinmonetaryterms.
....
266 See, e.g.,Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887,893(11thCir.2013).
267 InthisSection,ourapproachtointerpreting § 1988 proceed[s] on the assumption that
judges must act as Congresss faithful agent, which is the standard account of the role of
the judge in the federal system. JOHN F.MANNING & MATTHEW C.STEPHENSON,LEGIS-
LATION AND REGULATION 201(2010).Thecentralquestion,andtheoneonwhichwefocus,
iswhetherCongressmeantto includenominaldamagescasesamong thoseforwhich
attorneys fees may be awarded. In interpreting some statutes, other issues arise because of
conflictsbetweenthetextandthepurposeorbecausethepassageoftimehasalteredthe
contextinwhichthestatutewillbeapplied.But§1988,abroadlywordedandcomparatively
recentstatute,doesnotpresentsuchissues.
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Becausedamagesawardsdonotreflectfullythepublicbene-
fitadvancedbycivilrightslitigation,Congress didnotintendfor
feesincivilrightscases...todependonobtainingsubstantial
monetaryrelief.268
Privatelitigationisanecessarymechanism forachievingthepublicbenefitsof
vindicatingconstitutionalrights.Tobesure,thereareadditionalwaysbywhich
constitutionalrightscanbeenforced.Criminalprosecutionofthosewhoviolatethe
constitutionalrightsofothersisonesuchmechanism.So,too,istheassertionof
constitutionalrightsasadefensetocriminalprosecution.Butthesearenotenough.
TheSenateReportaccompanyingthefeestatutenoted:
[C]ivilrightslawsdependheavilyuponprivateenforcement,and
feeawardshaveprovedanessentialremedyifprivatecitizens
aretohaveameaningfulopportunitytovindicatetheimportant
Congressionalpolicieswhichtheselawscontain.
....
Thereareveryfew provisionsinourFederallawswhichareself-
executing.Enforcementofthelawsdependsongovernmental
actionand,insomecases,onprivateactionthroughthecourts.269
Congressalsoexpresslyrecognizedthattheservicesofanattorneywereessen-
tialforprivateenforcementofcivilrights,andafeeawardwasessentialtosecure
thoseservices.TheHouseReportonthefeestatutenoted:
TheCommitteealsoreceivedevidencethatprivatelawyerswere
refusingtotakecertaintypesofcivilrightscasesbecausethe
civilrightsbar,alreadyshortonresources,couldnotaffordtodo
so....[T]heCommitteedecidedtoreportabillallowingfeesto
prevailingpartiesincertaincivilrightscases.270
TheSenateReportisevenmoreexplicitonthispoint:
Inmanycasesarisingunderourcivilrightslaws,thecitizen
whomustsuetoenforcethelawhaslittleornomoneywithwhich
tohirealawyer.Ifprivatecitizensaretobeabletoasserttheir
civil rights, and if those who violate the Nations fundamental
268 477 U.S. 561, 57475 (1986) (emphasis added).
269 S.REP.NO.94-1011,at2,6(1976).
270 H.R.REP.NO.94-1558,at3(1976).
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lawsarenottoproceedwithimpunity,thencitizensmusthave
theopportunitytorecoverwhatitcoststhem tovindicatethese
rightsincourt.271
ThelegislativehistoryleavesnodoubtthatCongressrecognizedthatthereare
publicbenefitsfrom privateenforcementofcivilrightslaws,thatprivateenforce-
mentrequireslegalrepresentation,thatmoneydamagesareoftenlow,andthatan
awardoffeestoprevailingplaintiffsisanecessaryingredienttoanystrategyofpri-
vateenforcement.272Thegoalsof§1988includevindicationofconstitutionalrights
anddeterringconstitutionalviolationsbyencouraging§1983litigationthatserves
thoseaims.273 Sincearuleagainstfeesinlow damagescaseswouldreducethe
efficacyofoursystem ofconstitutionalremedies,thelegislativehistorycounsels
againstagenerallimitonfeesinlow damagescases.Gray,Aponte,McAfee,and
Richardson seem torestonthepremisethatvindicationanddeterrenceshouldbe
furtheredonlyincasesinwhichplaintiffscanprovesubstantialdamagesunderthe
Carey/Stachura doctrine.274 Neither the legislative history nor the Courts doctrine
onprospectivereliefsupportthatpremise.
Itdoesnotfollow thateveryplaintiffwhoprevailsonatechnicalissueisen-
titled to a fee. As Justice OConnor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Farrar,
theoverallpurposeof§1988wastorestorethepre-Alyeska equitable practice of
awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party in certain civil rights cases . . . .275
Thus, the statute provides that the judge may award a reasonable fee.276A whole
rangeofequitableconsiderationsbearon judicialresolution offeeissues.For
example,indiscriminatefeeawardswouldgenerateunjustifiedcostsbyencouraging
low value litigation and withdrawing limited judicial resources from other claims.277
InacaselikeFarrar,wheretheinjuryforwhichtheplaintiffsoughtredresswasnot
causedbyaviolationofhisconstitutionalrights,itmaybeappropriatetodenyfees
onequitablegrounds.278InGray,Aponte,McAfee,andRichardson,theobjectionto
afeeawardwasmerelythatthedamageswerenominal,orlow,orlessthanthe
271 S.REP.NO.94-1011,at2.
272 It is also worth noting that empirical studies of loser pays rules suggest that the fee
awardsgenerallyfallshortofactuallegalexpenses.See TheodoreEisenberg,TaliaFisher&Issi
Rosen-Zvi,Attorneys Fees in a Loser-Pays System,162U.PA.L.REV.1619,1656(2014).
273 See, e.g.,S.REP.NO.94-1011.
274 See supra notes 17686 and accompanying text.
275 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 118 (1992) (OConnor, J., concurring).
276 42U.S.C.§1988(2012).
277 Flenniken,supra note154,at488;see also JonathanFischbach& MichaelFischbach,
Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting,19BYU J.
PUB.L.317, 33839 (2005) (discussing the costs generated by fee shifting).
278 Recall,however,thatthedissentersinFarrar correctly pointed out that the issue [of
whatfeeisreasonable]wasneitherpresentedinthepetitionforcertiorarinorbriefedbypeti-
tioners. 506 U.S. at 123 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens,andSouter.
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plaintiffsought.279 The force of the equitable case for attorneys fees turns on how
success is measured. That case is strong only if success depends on the amount
awarded or on judicial assessment of the plaintiffs motivations. We have argued to
the contrary that the low award, low fee rule is in tension with the Supreme
Courts Lefemine doctrineonprospectiverelief,thatthestatutorypurposeisbetter
servedbyaskingwhetherthelitigationfurthersthevindicationanddeterrencegoals
of§1983,andthatlow awardsoftenfurtherbothofthosegoals.280
Twogeneralfeaturesoffederalcourtconstitutionallitigationbolsterourthesis.
One relates to the showing a plaintiff has to make in order to obtain prevailing
party status in the first place. Given the official immunity doctrine, no plaintiff ever
meets the prevailing party threshold in litigation against an individual government
officialwithoutshowing,notonlythattheofficialviolatedaconstitutionalright,but
also that the constitutional rule was clearly established at the time he acted.281 In
addition,many(butnotall)plaintiffssuinglocalgovernmentsmustshow eitherthat
high-ranking officials were in one way or another deliberately indifferent to their
constitutionalrights.282 Becauseoftheserequirements,manysuccessfulplaintiffs
insuitsfordamagesareespeciallywell-placedtodemandvindication,astheyhave
shownnotjustthattheirrightswereviolated,butthatsomedegreeoffaultwasin-
volvedintheviolations.Forthesamereason,theycancrediblyclaim thatdeterrence
isespeciallyneeded.Eveniftheamountofdamagesinagivencaseissmall,officers
who violateclearlyestablished rightsand high ranking officialswho paylittle
attentiontoviolationsbytheirsubordinatesshouldhaveincentivestostop.Onboth
deterrenceandvindicationgrounds,theequitablecaseforafeeisstrongeronac-
countofthesedistinctivedemandsplaintiffsmustmeetinordertoprevailina§1983
suitfordamages.
Theothergeneralfeatureisonethatappliestoalllitigationinthefederalcourts.
UnderRule68,283thedefendantcanalwaystakestepstoputastoptofutureattor-
neys fees by serv[ing] on an opposing party an offer to alow judgment on specified
terms, with the costs then accrued.284 If the plaintiff declines, and the judgment
thattheoffereefinallyobtainsisnotmorefavorablethantheunacceptedoffer,the
offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.285 The costs referred
to in Rule 68 include attorneys fees under § 1988. In Marek v. Chesny,286theCourt
279 See Richardsonv.CityofChicago,740F.3d1099,1103(7thCir.2014);McAfeev.
Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 9293 (4th Cir. 2013); Aponte v. City of Chicago, 728 F.3d 724, 731
(7thCir.2013);Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887,894(11thCir.2013).
280 See supra notes 23039 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note24andaccompanyingtext.
282 See supra notes 5153 and accompanying text.
283 FED.R.CIV.P.68.
284 FED.R.CIV.P.68(a).
285 FED.R.CIV.P.68(d).
286 473U.S.1(1985).
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held that a civil rights plaintiff who rejected the defendants Rule 68 offer and re-
covered less than the offer at trial was not entitled to recover post-offer atorneys
fees.287 Given the official immunity doctrine for officials and the deliberate indiffer-
ence hurdles plaintiffs face in many suits against governments, it seems likely that
officialsandgovernmentswilloftenknow earlyonthattheyriskanultimateloss.
Forexample,therightofthenine-year-oldnottobehandcuffedatschoolwithout
probablecausewasclearlyestablished.288 Ofcourse,everyoneisentitledtofight
litigationtotheend.Butsupposeafairassessmentoftheultimateoutcomecanbe
madeearlyon.Inthatevent,asubstantialamountofthecostsoflitigationareat-
tributable not to the plaintiffs decision to pursue the case for the sake of bare
vindication and a nominal award. They are, instead, the defendants responsibility.
Hereagaintheequitableconsiderationsbearingonfeeawardshavearoleto
play.InlightoftheRule68option,itseemsfair,inapropercase,toassignthecostsof
continuedlitigationtostrategicortacticallitigationdecisionsmadebythedefendant
orhislawyerandtoputthedefendanttothechoiceofwhethertoriskpayingforthe
plaintiffs attorneys fees. For example, the litigation in Gray wentonforseveral
yearsandincludedthreetripstotheEleventhCircuit,eventhoughthedefendant
violatedaclearlyestablishedFourthAmendmentright.289 Nodoubttheextended
litigation generated significant attorneys fees on the plaintiffs side, but those fees
hadtobeincurredinordertovindicateconstitutionalrightsandhelpdeterfuturevio-
lations.Theyinnowaysuggestthatthelitigationwasfutileorwasteful,andtheyare
fairlyattributabletotheobduraterefusalofthedefensetoacknowledgethewrong.
III.SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING APPLICATIONS FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES IN NOMINAL OR LOW DAMAGEAWARD CASES
StartingwithHensleys focus on success as the key factor in determining a
reasonable fee, we have argued that success is a more complex test than some of
thelanguageinFarrar wouldsuggest.290Thefocusofjudicialattentionshouldbe
onwhetherthelitigationfurtheredthevindicationanddeterrencegoalsof§1983
litigation.Ifso,theplaintiffshouldgetafeeunder§1988becausethatstatuteis
aimedatencouragingworthwhile§1983suitsforbothdamagesandprospective
relief.ThelitigationinFarrar may have accomplished little beyond giving peti-
tioners the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their]
rights had been violated in some unspecified way.291 Itdoesnotfollow from
Farrar thatallornearlyallnominalrecoveriesaccomplishlittle.Aswehaveshown,
287 Id. at11.Foranoverview ofthepracticesandattitudesofcivilrightslawyersincon-
nectionwithRule68,seegenerallyLewis& Eaton,supra note213.
288 Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887,895(11thCir.2013).
289 Id. at 89092.
290 See supra notes 17077 and accompanying text.
291 Farrarv.Hobby,506U.S.103,114(1992)(alterationinoriginal).
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nominaldamagescanbothvindicaterightsanddeterviolationsincasesinwhichthe
plaintiffs only shortcoming, if there is one, is the failure to meet the demanding
Carey/Stachura testforcompensatorydamages.YetGray,Aponte,McAfee,and
Richardson treatFarrar ashavingestablishedageneralprinciplethatfeesshould
bedeniedinnominaldamagescasesandreducedinothercaseswheretheawardis
small.292Wehavearguedthatthesecourtsaremistakenintheirinterpretationofthe
Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976. In this section of the Article, we
suggestfourguidelinesfordeterminingfeesinlow damagescases.
A. A Presumption in Favor of the Lodestar
Hensley directsthatthelodestarfigureshouldbereducedforlackofsuccess,293
andFarrar holdsthatlackofsuccessincludesthecaseinwhichtheplaintiffwins
ontheconstitutionalmeritsbutfailstoshow asufficientcausalconnectionbetween
theconstitutionalviolationandtheinjuryforwhichtheplaintiffseeksredress.294
Casesinwhichjuriesconclude,astheFarrar jurydid,thattheplaintiffhadfailed
toshow thattheviolationwastheproximatecauseofthedamagesfallintothiscate-
gory.Ifweareright,andFarrar isreadnarrowly,thecasedoesnotalsorequire
subtractingfrom thelodestarwhentheplaintiffshowsadirectlinkbetweenthe
constitutionalviolationandtheinjuryassertedbutreceivesalow ornominalaward
onlybecausehecannotprovesignificantcompensatorydamagesonaccountofthe
limitsondamagesimposedinCarey andStachura.Perhapsthebestwaytodistin-
guishthetwoclassesofcasesistoroutinelyaskthejurytoansweraspecialinter-
rogatoryliketheoneinFarrar,295withtheprovisothatthereisadifferencebetween
injury and amount of damages. Or perhaps this question is better left to the judge.
Ineitherevent,thejudgeorjuryshouldbearinmindthatprospectivereliefisrou-
tinelygrantedtoplaintiffswhocannotshow monetaryinjury.Webelieveplaintiffs
wouldfarewellinmanycaseslikeGray underthisapproach.
This approach would apply the Courts lodestar principle across the whole
rangeof§1983cases.296InPerdue v. Kenny A.,theSupremeCourtruledthatthe
lodestar method yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve [§ 1988's]
objective of enforcing the civil rights statutes, without enhancements for success
exceptinrarecases.297Conversely,thelodestarshouldalsogoverncaseslikeGray
292 See supra notes 15457 and accompanying text.
293 Hensleyv.Eckerhart,461U.S.424,440(1983).
294 Farrar,506U.S.at115.
295 Id. at 10607.
296 Somecommentatorsfindfaultwiththelodestarmethodandrecommendthatitbe
replacedormodified.See, e.g.,CharlesSilver,Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee
Award Procedure,70TEX.L.REV.865, 95154 (1992) (marshalingargumentsagainstthelode-
star). We do not take sides on that issue but take the Courts rule as a given for present purposes.
297 559U.S.542,552(2010).
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inwhichtheplaintiffsucceedsinvindicatinghisconstitutionalrightsbutcannot
provesubstantialcompensatorydamages.Theplaintiffinsuchacasehassucceeded
invindicatinghisrightsandhasdonesoagainstheavyodds.Hehasnotonlyestab-
lishedaviolationofhisrightsbut,inlitigationagainstofficials,hasalsoovercome
officialimmunity.Theplaintiffwhosuccessfullysuesalocalgovernmenthasproven
that some official policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional
violation.298 Ofcourse,theHensley ruleswouldalsoapply.299 Thus,theplaintiff
shouldnotgetafeeforhoursspentbythelawyertrying,butfailing,toproveclaims
unrelatedtotheoneuponwhichheprevailed.
B. Getting Less Than One Asks For
Hensley requiresthatthefeebeadjustedtoreflectlimitedsuccess.300 Thus,a
plaintiffwhomakesthreeunrelatedclaimsandsucceedsononemayreceivelessin
afeeawardthanasimilarlysituatedplaintiffwhoprevailedonallthree.Caseslike
Gray reasonthattheplaintiffwhoobtainslessthanheasksfornecessarilyachieves
limitedsuccess.301 Inourview,itshouldnotmatterwhethertheplaintiffaskedfor
morethanhereceived,madenospecificrequest,orgotwhatheaskedfor.Yetcourts
findthissignificant.InFarrar theplaintiffaskedfor$17millionandreceived$1
in nominaldamages.302 The majority opinion notesthisdisparity,and Justice
OConnor, in her concurring opinion, emphasizes that Farrar asked for a bundle and
got a pittance.303 She goes on to note that, under pre§ 1988 attorneys fee princi-
ples, a substantial difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery
sought suggests that the victory is in fact purely technical.304Theimplicationseems
tobethattheplaintiffismorelikelytobedeemedcompletelysuccessfulifheasks
forlessandgetsmostofitthanifheasksformoreandgetslessofit.Andforsome
courtsthegapmattersevenwheretheratioisfarlessthanseventeenmillion-to-one.
InGray thecourtappliestheprincipletoacaseinwhich,accordingtotheopinion,
theplaintiffaskedfor$25,000andgot$1.305
There is, however, a difference between limited success and not getting what
one asked for. Hensley holdsthatanattorneywhospendshoursonunrelatedfutile
claimsshouldnotreceivea§1988awardtotheextentthosehourscanbeseparated
from hoursspentonsuccessfulones.306 Bythesametoken,hoursspenttrying,but
298 See supra notes 4041 and accompanying text.
299 Hensleyv.Eckerhart,461U.S.424,440(1983).
300 Id.
301 Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887,895(11thCir.2013).
302 Farrarv.Hobby,506U.S.103,107(1992).
303 Id. at 120 (OConnor, J., concurring).
304 Id. at121.
305 Gray,720F.3dat895.
306 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 43435 (1983).
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failing, to prove that a particular harm was caused by the defendants violation, as
the plaintiffs attorney did in Farrar,shouldnotbecompensatedunder§1988.The
sameistrueofhoursspenttryingtoproveagivenelementofdamages,aswherethe
plaintiffclaimsemotionaldistressorphysicalinjurybuttheproofisinsufficientto
convinceajury.Butitdoesnotfollow from Hensley,oranyofthesevariationson
theHensley principle,thatthegap,by itself,shouldcountagainstthefee,asafactor
forreducingthelodestar.307SupposethecaseislikeGray:theplaintiffassertsjust
oneclaim andwinsonthemerits,causationissettled,andtheattorneydoesnot
devotehourstoafutileefforttoproveemotionaldistressorsomeotherconsequen-
tialharm.Insuchacase,themerefactthatthecomplaintincludedaprayerforan
awardofdamages,orthattheattorneysuggestedaspecificfigureinclosingargu-
ment,shouldnotcountagainstthefee.
We have addressed this issue above in a slightly different context whether
courts can or should make judgments about the plaintiffs subjective experience of
successandthepitfallsofcomparingtheamountofdamagessoughtandtheamount
awarded asaproxyforsuccess.308 Theshortcomingsofmeasuring successby
comparingdamagessoughtanddamagesawardedleadusto concludethatthis
measureshouldnotbeafactorinassessingafeeaward.Oneproblem,notedearlier,
isthatitmaycreateaconflictofinterest.309Ifmodestsuccessisrewardedwithabig
feewhenlittleissoughtbywayofdamages,andifsimilarsuccessispunishedbya
small fee when big compensatory damages are sought, the plaintiffs lawyers interests
arebetterservedbytakingtheformerroutewhilehisclientmaybebetterservedby
thelatter,asonecannotexpectabigdamagesawardwithoutaskingforit.310
Second,theproblem isexacerbatedbythedifficultyofpredictinghow agiven
jurywillrespondtoarequestfornonpecuniarydamages,adifficultythatiswell-
documented in ordinary tortlaw and thatmay beeven greaterin apolitically
chargedarealikeconstitutionaltorts.Quiteapartfrom anyethicalproblem facedby
the plaintiffs lawyer, giving significance to the gap between damages sought and
damagesawardedputstheplaintiffandhislawyerinanuntenableposition.Inorder
toobtainahighfee,theymustmakeareasonablyaccurateforecastofhow ajury
willcalculatenonpecuniarydamages,andperhapspunitivedamages,eventhough
therearewidedisparitiesamongjuriesinarrivingatthesefigures.Theresultisa
kindoflotteryinwhichobtaininghighfeesisamatterofchance.
307 Someopinionsdonotclearlydistinguishbetweenthetwofactpaterns,aswethinkthey
should.See, e.g., Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming a district judges
reduction of attorneys fees but leaving it unclear whether the reduction was justified by
failuretoprevailonalloftheclaimsorbythelimitedjuryawardontheclaim astowhich
plaintiffprevailed).
308 See supra notes 20209 and accompanying text.
309 See supra notes 20910 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 20910 and accompanying text.
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Third, one rationale for allowing the plaintiff to obtain attorneys fees in low
damage, evident injury cases is that he has vindicated his rights. Justice OConnor
seemedtoagreethatvindicationtakesplaceinlow awardcases,forshedescribed
§ 1988 as a tool that ensures the vindication of important rights, even when large
sums of money are not at stake . . . .311 Thevalidityandforceofthiscongressio-
nallysanctionedrationaledoesnotdependonwhethertheplaintiffaskedformore
thanhereceived.
Fourth,alongwithvindication,oneoftheaimsofconstitutionaltortlaw isto
deterconstitutionalviolations.312Thetheoryisthatofficersandgovernmentswould
prefertospendmoneyinotherwaysthanpayingitindamages,andbeingforcedto
paydamageswhentheyviolaterightswillinducethem toforegoviolationsthey
wouldotherwisecommit.Givingweighttothedifferencebetweendamagessought
anddamagesawardedseemslikelytoleadtolowerrequestsfordamages,asasking
formorecanberisky.313Butaskingforlesswillleadjuriestosystematicallyaward
less,andtheresultoverarangeofcasesandovertimewillbelessdeterrence.
C. Punitive Damages
InRichardson v. City of Chicago,theplaintiffreceivednominaldamagesof$1
and$3,000inpunitivedamages.314Thepunitiveawardcarriedgreatsignificancefor
the Seventh Circuit panel. It asserted that [i]f the jury had stopped with the $1 in
nominaldamages,thenunderFarrar an award of attorneys fees would be un-war-
ranted [sic].315 It went on to approve a substantial attorneys fee, though less than
plaintiffhadrequested.Undertheapproachwehavesuggested,Richardsons proviso
wouldberepudiated.Sinceasubstantialfeecanbejustifiedfornominaldamages
standingalone,theavailabilityofasubstantialfeeshouldnotdependonwhether
punitivedamageswereawarded.
Whilepunitivedamagesarenotnecessary tosupportafeefornominaldamages,
itdoesnotfollow thatpunitivedamagesareirrelevant.Theplaintiffinsuchacase
has not only succeeded in showing that the defendants actions are unconstitutional
andthathisactionsviolatedclearlyestablishedconstitutionallaw,avoidingofficial
immunity, but has achieved even greater success by showing that the defendants
actionsaresufficientlyreprehensibletosupportpunitivedamages.Strictlyspeaking,
the punitive award does not vindicate the plaintiffs rights, as no one is entitled to
311 Farrarv.Hobby,506U.S.103,122(1992).
312 See, e.g.,MemphisCmty.Sch.Dist.v.Stachura,477U.S.299(1986);Smithv.Wade,
461U.S.30(1983);Owenv.CityofIndependence,445U.S.622,650(1980).
313 See Rosenthal,supra note 24, at 82 ([T]he bottom line is clear the less money the
plaintiffrequests,themorelikelyheistorecover attorneys fees if he is awarded only nomi-
nal damages.).
314 740F.3d1099,1101(7thCir.2014).
315 Id.
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punitivedamages.Buttheawardmayprovideextradeterrence,and,inanyevent,
it serves the important goal of expressing strong disapproval of the officers conduct
andwilllikelyenhancerespectfortheconstitutionalvaluesatstake.
D. The Significance of the Legal Issue and Public Purpose
InCarey v. Piphus, the Courts first § 1983 damages case, the Court said that
awardsofnominaldamagescouldvindicateconstitutionalrightsevenwhenplain-
tiffscouldnotprovecompensatorydamages.316 According to Justice OConnors
Farrar concurrence,Carey makes clear that an award of nominal damages can rep-
resentavictoryinthesenseofvindicatingrightseventhoughnoactualdamagesare
proved.317Shethenwentontoidentifytwoadditionalfactorsbearingonwhether
afeeshouldbeawardedinanominaldamagescase.
One was the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to
have prevailed.318InFarrar, thisfactorseemstohavehadnoindependentsignifi-
cance, even for Justice OConnor. She simply notes that Farrar succeeded on just one
issueagainstoneofseveraldefendantsandshowednocompensatorydamages.319
It was a hollow victory, since game, set, and match all went to the defendants.320
Thisisnotsurprisingsincetheprecisenatureoftheconstitutionalrightatissueand
how itwasviolatedarenotspecificallydiscussedintheopinion.Itishardtodeem
significant that which is not identified.
InGray,theEleventhCircuitpaneldevotedmoreattentiontothisfactor.Itruled
infavorofGrayontheFourthAmendmentissue,holdingthattheFourthAmend-
ment forbids handcuffing . . . a compliant nine-year-old girl for the sole purpose
of punishing her.321 Thecourtreasonedthatthiswasnotasignificantissue.322 In
ordertounderstandwhy,itisimportanttokeepinmindthatthecourtshadrebuffed
the defendants effort to avoid liability on officialimmunity grounds.323 Judge
Bowen, writing for the panel, reasoned that since every objectively reasonable
officer would have known that Bostics conduct violated the Constitution, then the
significance of the case as a precedential example is greatly diminished.324
It is easy enough to find fault with Judge Bowens reasoning. This reasoning
createsaninescapablecatch-22underwhichfeeawardswouldneverbemadeto
civilrightsplaintiffswhorecoveronlynominaldamages.Iftheclearlyestablished
316 435 U.S. 247, 26667 (1978).
317 Farrarv.Hobby,506U.S.103,121(1992).
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Grayex rel. Alexanderv.Bostic,720F.3d887,896(11thCir.2013).
322 Id. at897.
323 Id. at896.
324 Id.
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natureoftherightmakesthevictoryinsignificantforpurposesofsupportingafee
award,thentheprevailingplaintiffcannotrecoverafee.Iftheconstitutionalright
wasnotclearlyestablished,thenthedefendantwouldbeentitledtoqualifiedimmu-
nity,theplaintiffwouldnotbeaprevailingparty,andnofeecouldbeawarded.This
is the ultimate heads I win, tails you lose scenario for individual defendants.325Such
aresultwouldmakeitincreasinglydifficultforcivilrightsplaintiffswithmeritori-
ous claims but problematic damages to secure legal representation a result flatly
inconsistentwithCongressionalintent.
Justice OConnors second factor is whether the litigation accomplished some
public goalotherthan occupying the time and energy ofcounsel,court,and
client.326InFarrar,thetrialanditsoutcomeproducednodefinitiveholdingonany
issue. The verdict, which even the plaintiffs counsel characterized as regrettably
obtuse,327 makesitimpossibletoknow justwhatthejuryfoundtobeunconstitu-
tional. Thus, the plaintiffs victory carrie[d] no discernible meaning.328Thatcriticism
couldnotbeleveledatGray.Thelitigation,quiteunambiguously,foundthatBostic
had violated Grays Fourth Amendment rights.329JudgeBowennonethelessfound
that no public purpose had been achieved, because an examination of Grays relief
soughtandobtainedmakesclearthattheprimarypurposeofherlawsuitwasthe
recovery of private damages.330 As with significance, this objection could be
leveled atalmostallsuitsfordamagesforconstitutionalviolations.Such suits
necessarilyfocusonwhathappenedtoanindividualinanarrowlydefinedencounter
with some official. Given Justice OConnors focus on the facts of Farrar,itishard
toknow whattypeofcaseshemayhavehadinmind,but,asageneralproposition,
thecategoryofsuitsthataccomplishsomepublicpurposewillconsistmainlyof
litigationseekingprospectivereliefthatobligesofficialstochangetheirconduct
towardalargenumberofpeople.
Ourpointisnotatalltodenythatthereareconstitutionaltortcasesinwhich
significance and public purpose could justify higher fees than nominal or low
damages would ordinarily justify. When these factors are present, the case for suc-
cess is stronger and the case for a big fee is correspondingly stronger.331 Our
325 There is a kernel of truth in Judge Bowens reasoning. In suits against local governments,
thedefenseofqualifiedimmunitydoesnotapply.Owenv.CityofIndependence,445U.S.
622,638(1980).Thus,itistheoreticallypossibleforaplaintifftorecoverfrom citiesfor
violationsofconstitutionalrightsthatwerenotclearlyestablishedatthetimeoftheincident,
butthedemandsofprovinganofficialpolicyorcustom rendersthispossibilityquiteremote.
326 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 12122 (1992) (OConnor, J., concurring).
327 Id. at122.
328 Id.
329 Gray,720F.3dat896.
330 Id. at899.
331 See, e.g.,Lowryv.WatsonChapelSch.Dist.,540F.3d752,765(8thCir.2008)(besides
nominaldamages,plaintiffswhosuccessfullychallengeddisciplinaryactiontakenagainst
them for wearing black armbands as a form of speech obtained an injunction that benefitted
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objection to both of these factors is that Justice OConnor, and lower courts folowing
herlead,treatthem asgroundsforanexceptiontoageneralruleagainstanyaward
of attorneys fees. We have argued that fees in low award cases are fully justified
by focusing on the plaintiffs success at achieving vindication. That success is es-
tablishedbyobtainingnominaldamagesincases,suchasGray, which fit the low
damage, evident constitutional injury fact pattern. That should be sufficient to justify
afeebased,moreorless,onthelodestar.Asthelegislativehistorydemonstrates,
Congressdeterminedthatthevindicationofconstitutionalrightsthroughprivate
litigationisbothsignificantandservesapublicpurpose.
CONCLUSION
SomecourtsofappealshavereadFarrar to deny attorneys fee awards to pre-
vailingplaintiffswhorecoveronlynominalorsmallcompensatorydamages.This
reading ofFarrar iswrong.Thegoalsofvindicating constitutionalrightsand
deterring constitutional violations goals underlying § 1988 support the award of
feestoprevailingplaintiffswhoprovethatgovernmentofficialsviolatedtheirclearly
establishedconstitutionalrights.Thisprincipleapplieswithequalforcetoplaintiffs
whoprovethatalocalgovernmenthasviolatedtheirconstitutionalrightsbywayof
anofficialpolicyorcustom.Awardingfeesinthesecasesrecognizesthatinlitigation,
as in life, success is not measured solely in terms of money. When a plaintiff brings
aconstitutionalwrongdoertoaccount,thatplaintiffhassuccessfullyvindicatedthe
valuesthat§1983promotes,andthatsuccesssupportstherecovery of atorneys fees
under§1988.
allofthestudentsintheschooldistrict,andthefreespeechrightvindicatedwasnotreadily
reducible to a sum of money) It may well be that, even absent the injunction, the precedent
establishedbytheirvictorywouldsimilarlyserveapublicpurpose.
